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                          Abstract 
Micro-grid (MG) has been introduced as a low voltage and a very small power system 
connected to a distribution grid through the point of common coupling. It consists of distributed 
energy resources (DERs) such as solar Photovoltaic (PV), wind turbine, fuel cell, etc.), 
interconnected load and energy storage sources. It can operate in grid-connected (i.e. when 
connected to the main grid) or islanded (i.e. when not connected to the main grid) mode. It has 
an advantage of utilizing low carbon sources and the possibility of its use in the remote local 
environment, which means that the transmission infrastructures and their associated costs may 
be deferred. Although there has been a proliferation of optimization methods of energy 
management in the MG, most of these methods consider self-interest of the players in profit 
distribution. Moreover, only a few of them consider a fair profit distribution using Nash 
bargaining solution (NBS) (i.e. when utility function is linear) leading to even profit 
distribution and high degree of dissatisfaction. For the MG to achieve better economic 
outcomes, a novel method based on weighted fair energy management among the participants 
(i.e. building of different types, such as residential buildings, schools, and shops) is proposed. 
The novelty of the proposed method lies in the new profit sharing method to favour certain 
participant by assigning a weight to each participant with cooperative game theory (CGT) 
approach using generalized Nash bargaining solution (GNBS). The proposed approach 
achieves a fair (reasonable or just) profit allocation with negotiating power indicator. 
In this work, a case study of six different participant sites is proposed using the CGT method 
of energy management. The proposed method is able to cope with the drawbacks of the existing 
independent method, which negotiate directly with other participants for selfish profit 
distribution. It is demonstrated that the independent method results in (1) a reduction in the 
profit of each participant of MG when compared with CGT approach and (2) the variation of 
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transfer prices in some participants having profit below the specified lower bound profit since 
the method does not take into consideration the lower profit bounds. 
The use of CGT method (i.e. when participants form a coalition) to finding multi-partner profit 
level subject to specified lower bounds is demonstrated. This results in (1) increase in the profit 
of the MG participants (2) maintaining the profit level of all the participants above status-quo 
profit (lower specified profit bounds) with variation in transfer prices and (3) allowing certain 
participant to be favoured by assigning higher negotiating power to such participant.  
To achieve the optimal solution in the proposed method, a teaching-learning-based 
optimization (TLBO) algorithm is presented to efficiently solve the problem.  For TLBO 
algorithm, no specific control parameters are needed except the number of generations and 
population size. This is in contrast with other heuristic algorithms such as genetic algorithm 
(GA) and particle swarm optimization (PSO) that require other control parameters (i.e. GA 
requires selection and crossover operation, while PSO makes use of social parameters and 
cognitive weight). To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed TLBO method, the profit 
allocations are tested in the grid-connected and the islanded mode using both the CGT and the 
independent method. In this work, the proposed TLBO method is compared with one traditional 
method, i.e. Lambda iteration method and two heuristic methods, i.e. PSO and GA.  Thus, by 
using TLBO a considerable amount of computation time is saved. Using the same parameter 
setting for all the heuristic algorithms used, 20 trials are performed to be able to compare the 
quality of solution and convergence characteristics. The investigation reveals that TLBO gives 
the highest quality solutions and better convergence characteristics compared to PSO and GA.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Throughout the world, electricity is one of the most powerful forces influencing the economy 
and industrialization of any nation, which can give rise to technological change. It is worth 
mentioning that a country needs to first, build a reliable and adequate electricity infrastructure 
that can cope with her electrical power needs before moving towards industrialization and 
stable economic growth from subsistence economy [1]. 
The micro-grid (MG) is introduced as an ideal platform with distributed network sources in the 
distribution network system. The alternative sources of energy such as photovoltaic (PV), wind 
energy (WE), and fuel cell in electrical power system has been a major focus in recent years 
due to the environmental and economic concerns over the conventional sources [2]. The micro-
grid emerges for the following reasons: 
(a)  the capability of utilizing energy resources with low carbon sources such as solar, wind 
energy, fuel cell, etc., 
(b) the possibility of its use in the remote local environment, which shows that transmission 
infrastructure and their associated costs, may be deferred. 
(c) finally, the MG has an advantage of a local network interconnection so that the 
participants can form a coalition with each other and providing more benefit [3]. 
There are two distinct modes of operation of the MG, the grid-connected and islanded modes. 
In a grid-connected mode, there is a power exchange between the main grid and the MG. In 
islanded mode, the MG acts as an independent entity and therefore, manages its production 
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independently. It also provides reactive power balance and control of frequency and voltage 
[4]. For example, if the power consumption is less than the net power generated the MGCC 
would reduce the total power generated. On the other hand, if the net power generated cannot 
cope with the load demand, the MGCC results in load shedding or immediate activation of the 
energy storage units to maintain power balance. 
The major concern of the electrical supply authorities worldwide is the increase in demand for 
electrical power system [5]. The present grid systems, which have been in existence since last 
century are rapidly ageing [5]. The infrastructures of these grid systems are becoming 
congested and unable to meet the future demand of the energy requirements of economies of 
the nations.  
1.1 Need for the Research 
The demand for reliable and clean power supply is greater than ever. By 2030, it is expected 
that global energy production would increase by 77% [6]. It is, therefore, important to have 
reliable, efficient, and cost-effective of delivering new energy to meet new demand. The need 
for cost-effective, reliable and efficient means to deliver that new energy to meet new demand 
is very important. Moreover, interests on the renewable supply have been increased due to the 
issues related to the global environmental pollution and the uncertainty gas prices so that clean 
and reliable energy be provided by the electricity sector to its customers. In smart grid, the high 
penetration of renewable energy supply can ensure environmental and economic benefits, 
efficiency and reduction in fossil fuel dependency with higher reliability and reduction in the 
cost of electricity [7]. 
To provide economic benefit to the participant of the MG, several approaches are used in cost 
minimization of the MG [3], [8]. Some of these approaches selfishly minimize cost for each 
participant, but the mutual cost minimization is not considered [3]. This raises the challenges 
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that the management and control of the MG need to be based on mutual interests of participants, 
rather than the self-interest of each participant. One of the ways of approaching these 
drawbacks is to use game theory so that Pareto-optimal can easily be obtained. The game theory 
technique can be regarded as a branch of applied mathematics, economics and applied sciences 
[9], [10], that is used in many disciplines. There have been several research works, which make 
use of game theory in designing and analysing a variety of issues for energy management in 
the smart grid [11], [12]. Even though the approach is a relatively young discipline, history has 
it that it has appeared in various forms and many sources, such as the Talmud, the works of 
Descartes and Sun Tzu and the writings of Charles Darwin [13], [14],  
Game theory is a conceptual and logical framework having some mathematical tools, which 
enable the complex interactions among the independent intelligent players that are rational 
[15]. Since there are many components in micro-grid, it is, therefore, challenging to operate a 
micro-grid in a conventional, fully centralized way [16]. It is important to know that each 
component needs to be autonomous and cooperative to work together as a micro-grid. The 
participants (such as hospitals, fire stations, restaurants, residential building, etc. with their 
respective DGs) of MG can be better by forming cooperation. By allowing the MG participants 
to cooperate with each other will provide a better economic outcome than being in isolation 
with pure self-interest. 
To obtain the full benefits of the micro-grid structure, several challenges were encountered by 
the micro-grid energy management, such as a fair multi-partner profit distribution with the 
difference in negotiation power. To tackle these challenges, a game theory of the multi-partner 
system using the generalized Nash Bargaining solution is proposed in this thesis. This has the 
advantages of providing better insights into the performance of the entire team when compared 
to the individual performance indices. Thus, the team profit function can be maximized with 
weighted fairness. A TLBO is also used to obtain the optimal solution. 
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1.2 Objective of the thesis 
An energy management system can be composed of software, hardware or both, in which 
operators of power system control, monitor, and carry out the optimal energy management. 
The hypothesis that the research is based states that the framework based on generalized Nash 
bargaining solution can be used in MG to enhance fair profit distribution among MG 
participants with negotiation power. The research question is how do we maximize the profit 
of the participants in community MG to enhance mutual benefit with negotiation power? The 
problem can be solved by introducing a new approach to the existing MG operational method 
using novel cooperative game theory based on generalized Nash bargaining solution. In this 
proposed approach, a fair weighted method of settlement among MG participants is essential. 
The aim of this thesis is to provide a fair profit distribution to all the participants with least 
environmental effects.  
In this research work, the optimal model of energy management system (EMS) is formulated 
as game theory approach, using the generalised Nash Bargaining solution approach with the 
objective to:  
(1)  Find an optimal profit level subject to the status-quo on the equivalent lifetime profit. 
(2)  Ensure a fair profit distribution with negotiation power 
(3)  Use of a robust and efficient algorithm, Teaching-Learning-Based Optimization (TLBO) 
to solve the resulting problem. 
1.3 Research Methodology 
In this work, an extensive review of relevant kinds of literature is initially carried out. This 
review includes the various methods of energy management systems. A comprehensive energy 
management system of a case study of six selected sites in a remote community is carried out 
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to determine the profit allocation to the participants and to align the interest of the individual 
participant in the MG. These participants provide different energy consumption patterns which 
make it possible for them to cooperate with each other and benefit within the micro-grid. Each 
participant will have its own power source in which excess can be transferred to another 
location (participant) or sell to the grid. Each participant is expected to have a diesel generator, 
solar PV, and battery storage source to ensure adequate supply during island mode and a grid 
connection (allowing energy exchange). 
1.4 Contribution of the Research 
The thesis presents cooperative energy management where participants can form a coalition to 
exchange energy within the micro-grid and the main grid to utilize resources efficiently and 
allocate the resultant utility to the participants. The main goal of this research is to develop a 
new framework for energy management of MG. The propose framework will have three key 
features: a) ability to capture many participants, b) ability to integrate participant’s needs in the 
MG, and c) ability to optimize participant profits based on different negotiation power. To this 
end, generalized Nash bargaining solution is used for fair profit distribution amongst MG 
participants. 
In this EMS, a novel generalized Nash bargaining solution is proposed to allow the participants 
have different negotiation power indicators, compared to related work on  [3], [17]- [18], the 
proposed model combines the advantages of both Nash bargaining solution with generalized 
Nash bargaining solution by allowing the participants to decide whether or not to favour certain 
participant. The approach is evaluated empirically and it is shown that: 
1.  There is an increase in overall profits of the participants in a grid-connected mode 
when using cooperative game theory with the aims of buying and selling electricity to 
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the main grid by 5.2% compared to when the participants independently manage their 
resources. 
2.  Application of cooperative game theory (CGT), using the generalized Nash bargaining 
solution (GNBS) gives a fair profit distribution with the difference in the participant 
negotiation power and thereby allocates higher bargaining power to a participant based 
on mutual agreement by all the participants. 
1.5 Outline of the Thesis 
The thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 
This chapter deals with the overview of the technologies that are important for energy 
management in the MG. It also discussed the rationale behind the introduction of MG, MG 
architecture, and management of MG. Introduction to cooperative game theory is discussed 
and particular emphasis is placed on axiomatic bargaining with analysis of Nash bargaining 
solution. 
Chapter 3 
This chapter introduces the modelling of components of MG. These components include a 
solar PV system, energy storage system, diesel generator, and the load. 
Chapter 4 
This chapter discusses the formulation of the EMS with regards to the objective function 
and its constraints. The use of game theory for fair allocation of the utility with special 
emphasis on proposed fairness scheme is discussed. This chapter also emphasizes the use 
of different optimization techniques employed in the energy management system. 
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Chapter 5 
In this chapter, simulation results and discussions of the proposed approach are discussed. 
Chapter 6 
In this chapter, the conclusion and recommendations for future work are presented. 
1.6 Summary 
In this chapter, the concept of micro-grid and the rationale behind the introduction of micro-
grid are presented. The need for the research and objective of the thesis are discussed. It is 
explained that the participants can be better by forming cooperation.  The methodology use in 
this research is presented, which has to do with extensive review of relevant literatures in 
energy management system when consider six selected sites in remote communities. Also, 
research contribution is discussed, which employs the use of cooperative game theory using 
generalized Nash bargaining solution to allocate the profit to all the participants based in 
consensus. Finally, the structure of the thesis is presented. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
This chapter provides a framework on the subject matter related to this work. Before the 
modelling EMS is developed, there is a need to review general components necessary and 
sufficient for EMS. Section 2.1 focusses on technologies for energy management of micro-
grid, which includes integration of DERs and energy storage system. Section 2.2 discusses the 
concept of MG, which relates to the MG architecture, centralized and decentralized energy 
management. In addition, section 2.3 provides some works in the context of game theory, in 
which cooperative and non-cooperative game theories are explained. Finally, section 3.4 
provides bargaining theory, in which axiomatic and strategic bargaining are reviewed. 
2.1 Technologies for Energy Management of Micro-grid 
This section introduces some technologies that are important for the establishment of energy 
management in Micro-grid. The advancement and current trend are discussed so that the reader 
is equipped with the knowledge of the technology that is necessary and sufficient for energy 
management of micro-grid. 
There is a need to determine the micro-sources that are adequate for electricity generation in 
sites/locations in remote communities. The distributed storage source also needs to be in the 
sites for each participant to store excess energy during off peak demand. 
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2.1.1 Micro-generation 
Micro-generation is a technical term used for the production of electricity from low carbon 
technology, such as solar PV, wind turbine, small combined heat and power (small CHP), 
diesel generator, etc. This is a small-scale production of electricity that can be used in homes.  
Historical accounts have it that this type of micro-generation has many advantages over large-
scale generations. For example, in a large-scale generation, electricity is transmitted over a long 
distance, which results in losses along the line. This can be avoided in a micro-generation. 
There are many ways of generating energy in homes. However, due to the comparatively low 
cost of installation and little maintenance required, the micro-sources used in this work are 
diesel generators and solar PV. 
A.        Diesel Generator 
One of the modern energy generations, that proves to be versatile and robust in providing 
energy to the rural community is the diesel generator. The diesel generator proves to be reliable. 
It is very efficient in providing the critical backup generator at schools, residential, 
commercials, the high reliability of the diesel generators and its high power-to-weight ratio has 
made them very popular [19], [20]. The fuel for the diesel generator is relatively common and 
has a high weight and volumetric [21], which means it can be found in relatively large quantity. 
However, it has some drawbacks when using it for a rural, off-grid electrification as it may be 
inaccessible or extremely expensive. The energy cost could be high due to difficulty in 
transporting it to the rural areas. In case of the scarcity in the spare parts of the diesel generator, 
maintenance may be non-trivial. 
In this research work, the diesel generator is used to cover the load deficit when solar PV and 
battery production are insufficient to provide sufficient and reliable power supply. The diesel 
generator is provided to cover the load demand and shut off when solar PV and battery are 
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sufficient for energy production. The operation of diesel generator should be within the 
minimum and maximum power range recommended by the manufacturer. The generator 
operation bound is given as follows: 
           𝑃𝐷𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝑃𝑔(𝑡) ≤ 𝑃𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥                                                                                          (2.1) 
where  
𝑃𝑔(𝑡) is the power generateD by diesel generator, 𝑃𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 is peak power, and 𝑃𝐷𝑚𝑖𝑛 is the 
minimum power. 
B.       Solar Photovoltaic (PV) 
The fundamental source of all kinds of energy resources is the solar energy. There are two ways 
of production of this energy, i.e. the photovoltaic and the solar thermal systems. Our attention 
is focussed on the solar PV as it forms a major non-dispatchable source in this work. 
Solar PV tends to be a renewable source that has a high rapid development. Although, 
throughout the world, the capacity of installed solar PV is much less than that of wind power 
(about 50%), the growth is faster than the wind power [22].. Figure 2.1 shows the global annual 
installed capacity of solar PV (2002-2018) [22].   
Except for 2012, newly installed solar PV capacity for each year has been a year of record-
breaking [22]. As opposed to early predictions, 2017 forecasts were estimated as 85 GW and  
therefore raised the estimate to 95GW at the near end of the year [22]. The cost of PV 
generation has continued to drop. In fact, it was said to have dropped from 0.9 $/kWh in 1980 
to about 0.2 $/kWh in 2017 [23]. The main goal of the department of energy (DoE) in the 
United States (U.S) is to ensure a reduction in solar PV generation to 0.06 $/kWh by 2020 [23]. 
In remote, inaccessible areas, the solar PV system tends to be the most economical long-term 
solution [24]. However, in general, energy from the local utility cost less than the energy from 
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the solar PV [23]. Currently, the capital cost of a diesel generator is on the lower side compared 
to a solar PV [23].  
 
Figure 2.1: Global Annual Installed Capacity of Solar PV since 2002 in Megawatts [22]. 
The operation of the main distribution utility grid can be affected by the stochastic nature of 
renewable energy sources. The production of the electricity from solar PV depends on the light 
intensity. In this case, the connections of the solar PV to the main grid have a positive impact 
on the network. It may also as well have a negative impact. This is because the proliferation of 
PV systems in low voltage distribution network may cause problems such as voltage rise, 
overcurrent, network loss increase, unbalanced voltage, increase in potential harmonics, and 
distribution network reverse power flow [25]. The penetration of a solar PV depends on the 
intensity of sunlight that fluctuates daily, hourly, or even shorter periods. The PV output power 
due to the fluctuation in the light intensity is shown in Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2: A Typical Solar PV Output Power [23] 
It is essential to estimate the solar radiation so that the output power of the solar PV can be 
determined. The radiation prediction of solar PV using the mathematical model, e.g., artificial 
neural network (ANN) tends to be accurately determined when compared to the use of 
regression model, empirical coefficient model, empirical regression model, and model based 
on fuzzy logic [23], [26]. In [27], the PV system power output connected with battery is 
predicted using a neural model. The weather information is used to design the model to 
accurately predict the capacity of the battery necessary to compensate the fluctuation of power 
output of solar PV. The power output of the solar PV is mostly affected by the weather 
conditions such as rainfall and cloud movement. 
2.1.2   Distributed Energy Storage Devices 
Distributed energy resources (DERs) such as solar PV and wind turbine are stochastic in nature 
and therefore, are non-dispatchable sources. For example, power generated by solar panels can 
be available only during the day while the power generated in a wind turbine depends on the 
wind speed. Due to the stochastic nature of these sources, storage devices are often used with 
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these DERs (renewable sources) to ensure that the energy supply is uninterrupted. A distributed 
storage source is used to provide power to the device to ensure continuity of supply when power 
is intermittent. 
Energy storage can be in many forms, but our interest is focussed on a distributed storage 
source on a domestic scale. The electric batteries and thermal storage are the distributed storage 
devices in homes [28], [29]. In remote communities, electric batteries are used to store energy 
generated by wind turbine or solar panels. The storage capacity and power are the two terms 
used in assessing energy storage devices. Storage capacity is the total energy stored in the 
system, while power referred to the rate of energy charging or discharging to/from the device. 
Watt-hour (Wh) is the unit in measuring storage capacity while watt (W) is used in measuring 
charging and discharging of the electric battery. 
Many factors determine the storage capacity and discharging rate. For example, a storage 
device may depend on the certain chemical reactions or on the battery size. Therefore, different 
devices may have different storage capacity and discharging rate. 
The introduction of electric vehicle (EV) device as a storage device is another related topic that 
is used for the transition to a low carbon economy [30]. The capacity of the device could be 
50kWh with 20-50kW power when used at home for electricity storage [29]. Modern vehicles 
with a battery pack of 50kW represent vehicles such as the Tesla Roadster from Tesla, Zhong 
Tai from Zotyg, etc. [28]. Electric vehicles of this nature have a high storage capacity as 
compared to the average energy consumption of 40kWh in a day per person for transportation 
[28], [31]. The next section will focus on concept of micro-grid and its configuration to form a 
distributed network for the participants. 
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2.2   Micro-grid 
Micro-grid possesses much practicability in a smart grid and hence, represents an important 
and necessary part of the development of smart grid [32]. The principle of operation of a micro-
grid has a relation to the production of the local power generation, load consumptions and 
electricity price in the main grid. 
In a conventional power system, the power flow is unidirectional from generation to load 
distribution system via transmission and distribution systems. With the advent of micro-grid, 
microgeneration such as solar power and wind power generation become popular for 
residential, commercial, and industrial use, hence, bidirectional power flow came to an 
existence. This, in essence, makes a micro-generation energy distribution system into a micro-
grid, which can either sell the excess energy to the main grid or purchase energy from the main 
grid. Different sizes of micro-grid are being used depending on the applications. For example, 
it may be used for smart homes, residential building, school, etc. 
2.2.1 Micro-grid Architecture 
A micro-grid consists of the distribution energy resources (DERs) such as renewable energy 
resources and conventional sources, smart homes and energy storage systems as shown in 
Figure 2.3. The connection of MG to the main grid is through a point of common coupling 
(PCC). The main grid determines the voltage at the point of the common coupling of the micro-
grid [33]. To achieve the proper control, protection, and metering with plug and play features, 
each DER must be with the power electronic interface (PEI) in both grid-connected and 
islanded mode. In grid-connected mode, there is an energy trading with the utility grid. 
However, when upstream faults occur in the main grid, micro-grid can be islanded, and can act 
independently to manage its own resources to enhance system stability. In this case, the   critical 
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loads can be protected by integration of the distribution energy resources, demand response, 
and load shedding [33], [34]. The micro-grid central controller (MGCC) and the local 
controllers (LCs) act as a mediator to control and coordinate the entire operation of micro-grid. 
Proper coordination and the effective management of DERs enhance system performance and 
sustainable development of the micro-grid [33]. 
 
 
                                             Figure 2.3: Micro-grid Architecture [33] 
Due to the greenhouse gas emission in the conventional energy resources, the awareness 
created on the climate change and the need to sustain the environment, micro-grid mainly 
consists of the DERs such as the solar PV, wind turbine, diesel generator, etc., and energy 
system that uses local heat waste such as biomass, cogeneration plant, etc., [35].  In this case, 
the decision-making strategies are solved by the MG energy management system (MG EMS) 
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which is achieved by the optimization of this energy system. For the sustainable development, 
the strategies consider would help to reduce the power consumption, enhance system 
reliability, reduce losses, mitigating greenhouse gas emission, and increase the energy system 
2.2.2 Micro-grid Energy Management 
Energy management is defined in [36] as the application of the computer system to ensure that 
the cost is minimized or profit is maximized with adequate security of energy supply. It makes 
use of the software platform that provide basic support services and some functional 
applications to ensure that the electrical generation and transmission facilities are operated 
effectively. The decision-making strategies are also implemented with the use of energy 
management system having these same features and required modules. The EMS decision-
making is efficiently implemented with the use of modules of load forecasting, DERs, human-
machine interface (HMI),  supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA), etc., by ensuring 
that the generation, load, and storage units receive an optimal decision [37]. There are many 
functions performed by EMS in a micro-grid such as analysing, monitoring, and forecasting 
generated power of DERs, energy market prices, etc., which help in optimization and satisfying 
necessary constraints. 
Micro-grid EMS control architectures are in two folds viz: the centralized energy management 
and decentralized energy management. The information such as the generated power of DERs, 
demand profile of the consumers, cost functions, and meteorological data are collected and sent 
to the micro-grid central controller (MGCC) in centralized EMS. The optimal scheduling of 
energy in micro-grid is then determined and the decision is sent to all local controllers (LCs). 
However, in the decentralized energy management, all the information is sent/received in real-
time by MGCC to/from all the local controllers. The generation schedule, future and the current 
demand are processed by each LC and sent to the MGCC, the optimal scheduling of energy is 
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then determined by the MGCC and sent back to the LC. There may be a disagreement on the 
current operation between the duo and therefore, bargaining ensues until an equilibrium is 
reached and the global objectives are achieved. With the introduction of DERs such as solar 
PV, wind turbine and the storage sources, the advent of micro-grid EMS replaces unit-
commitment and the conventional economic dispatch. 
Other strategies performed by the micro-grid EMS are the control of the stochastic nature of 
the renewable energy sources, load and DERs scheduling, loss minimization and outages, the 
economic and reliable operation of micro-grid. 
There are many approaches used in the past in the MG to solve these energy management 
strategies to obtain the efficient and optimal solution. In [17], a mix-mode EMS for the MG 
operation at a minimum cost and optimal battery sizing is presented. The linear programming 
methods are used to optimize the proposed power sharing and continuous run, while the mixed 
integer linear programming optimizes on/off mode. In [38], the optimal energy management 
system for the fuel consumption minimization of the diesel generator for remote military MG 
is presented. The effectiveness of mixed integer non-linear programming (MINLP) formulation 
was solved by special order sets 1 and 2, which, was validated experimentally. Vergara, et al. 
[39], present a mixed integer linear programming (MILP) model for the EMS of the electrical 
distribution system and three-phase residential MG. The proposed formulation penalizes the 
load shedding and minimizes the operational cost of MG. In [40], a real-time online EMS for 
cost minimization of the MG is proposed. Helal, et al. [41] presented an EMS for remote 
communities for the optimal scheduling of the generation technologies in hybrid AC/DC 
micro-grid. The problem is formulated using MINLP and solved by the micro-grid controller 
(MGC), which minimizes costs of DG units in the islanded mode. In [42], [43], a 
comprehensive framework for model predictive control (MPC) is proposed for cost 
minimization. 
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In the above models [17] - [43], the cost of the whole micro-grid was successfully minimized, 
but a fair cost minimization is not considered. To enable all the participants to benefit from the 
micro-grid, with fair profit/cost distribution, many existing works using the Nash bargaining 
model have been presented. In [3], a game theory, Nash bargaining solution (NBS) was applied 
for cost minimization of the grid-connected micro-grid to obtain a cost fair distribution among 
the participants. Hao Wang et al. [18] presented the Nash bargaining theory to achieve fair 
profit sharing and energy trading among micro-grids. However, the above approaches [3] and 
[18] to fairness is useful when the utility functions are linear (when the participants of MG are 
equal structurally and distribute profit equally). In reality, utility functions may be non-linear 
(i.e. the participants may not structurally equal). In this case, the surplus is unequal amongst 
the participants i.e. the result obtained when participants unanimously agreed upon a feasible 
outcome could be symmetric with the same profit or asymmetric with unequal profit 
distribution. As a variant of Nash bargaining power, the fairness can be improved by using 
asymmetric, which is the generalized Nash bargaining solution with the difference in 
negotiation power. This bargaining solution is proposed to achieve a trade-off between fairness 
and weighted fairness.  
 2.3   Game Theory 
Game theory is used to design and model decision-making that involved interaction with 
conflicting mutual interest [44]. The complex economic behaviours are solved by using game 
theory. It is used in many fields such as philosophy, politics, sociology, military 
telecommunication, communication, etc. as a result of studying complex dynamic among the 
participants [45], [46]. Recently, the issues in power system particularly in MG with respect to 
profit distribution have been addressed with the use of game theory [3], [47]. 
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Profit distribution among players is becoming an important issue in smart grid particularly in 
MG. In this context, cooperative game theory using NBS provides fair profit distribution and 
optimum allocation of profits among the players. Recently, game theory has been used to 
address power system issues including distribution energy management, dynamic pricing, 
demand smoothing, and matching the surplus [48]. Power systems are dynamic in terms of 
energy conservation, participant profit sharing, etc. All the participants ensure that their payoffs 
are maximized. The utility functions may be used in projecting the payoffs based on several 
decision criteria from all the participants where game theory can be well suited.  
There are three components of game theory i.e. the player set, the action set, and the payoff set. 
By adopting certain strategy, the players can raise their payoffs to the maximum at a certain 
time. Payoff may be allocated among players by using NBS, which make use of set axioms. 
The approach was originated with Nash. The correlation between game theory and MG has 
been tabulated in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Correlation between Game Theory and the MG 
Components 
of the game 
 
Game Theory 
Concept 
Micro-grid Concept 
Strategies Action involved 
while playing 
game. 
Action involved while playing 
game such as available players, 
dynamic pricing, offered prices, etc. 
Players Involvement of 
players in the 
game. 
Players involved in the game such 
as dwelling places, shops, factories, 
etc. 
Payoffs The profit 
allocated to 
each player 
The profit allocated to each player 
based on the utility functions 
Resources Money, fame. Profit needed by which the players 
are competing with each other, such 
as energy, power, etc. 
 
The concepts of game theory have just been discussed, in this section, the review of non-
cooperative game theory and cooperative game theory would be investigated. 
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2.3.1   Non-Cooperative Game Theory 
Non-cooperative game theory studies game plan between interactions among contesting 
participants. In the game, an agent is a participant, which aimed at maximizing the payoff by 
selecting an appropriate strategy. In this case, each participant selfishly maximizes his own 
profits. With the non-cooperative game, the Nash equilibrium is obtained [49]. Nash 
equilibrium is one of the fundamental concepts of GT, which determines solution in a no-
cooperative game by ensuring that no player has incentive in changing his/her own strategy. 
In smart grids, where small-scale power system like micro-grid is used, there must be a generic 
framework, that can capture the problem arising between the load and the source because of 
competition over the energy resources. With this aim, Weaver et al. [11], proposed a non-
cooperative game approach for controlling loads and power sources in electric energy system. 
In the paper, the authors described the static, non-cooperative game theory as a player having 
set 𝑁 = 𝐿 𝑈 𝑆  to represent the set of loads depicted by L and energy source 𝑆 and each player 
has its own strategy.  
2.3.2   Cooperative Game Theory 
The cooperative game theory is concerned with games where the mechanism is available to 
ensure binding agreement among a group of players. The idea is focussed on mutual 
(collective) benefit rather than the individual achievement of the players [28], [50]. For the 
implementation of the binding agreement, the mechanisms available are the formal legal 
contracts. The game theory considers a situation where the players act collectively and binding 
agreements are made by studying the strategies of individual players [28]. 
An example of the use of cooperative game theory can be demonstrated by considering a cluster 
of some factories, where the factory owners paid individually for their electricity consumption. 
To give them the ability to negotiate for a better deal (e.g. discount tariff) they can come 
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together to form a coalition, this will save them some money, which can be shared among the 
participants. Cooperative game theory is a powerful tool that can be useful to determine how 
the coalition can be formed and the sharing formula of the realised savings among the players 
can be achieved [15]. 
The formation of a coalition depends on its stability. For a stable coalition, no solution in the 
coalition can improve any of the objectives without degrading at least one of the other 
objectives [28]. The surplus, thus obtained can be shared using the Nash bargaining solution, 
as one of the bargaining solution concepts, which will be introduced later in the section. 
Two branches of the cooperative game theory are identified, they are, Transferable Utility (TU) 
game [51] and Non-Transferable Utility (NTU) game [28], [52]. In TU game, there is a 
transferable payoff of the measurement allocation game. For instance, in the above example, 
the profits obtained can be shared among the factories. In contrast, let us consider a situation 
where a supervisor collaborates with his student to publish a journal article. They will both 
benefit from the publication, but the benefits accruable to the student will be greater than that 
of the supervisor. This is because the student will derive higher value than the supervisor and 
the derived benefit of the student (scientific credibility, enhanced reputation) cannot be 
transferable to the supervisor. TU game attracts more popularity in a cooperative game theory 
to model game in this class [53]. Because of the relationship of TU game to the proposed work, 
we focus our attention on the formulation and discussion of TU game. There are two elements 
of TU game: the set of players and the characteristic function. The worth of a coalition is 
represented by the characteristic function. In TU game, a number represents the value. Let N= 
{1, 2, 3…, N} be the finite set of players and V the characteristic function that associate every 
subset of 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑁 with a number i.e.2𝑁 ⟶ 𝑅, the 𝑉(𝑆) may indicate the worth of coalitions 𝑆. 
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We assume that the characteristic functions are supper additive [54]. This means that the values 
of disjoint coalition unions should not be less than the individual value of coalitions i.e. 𝑆 ⊆
𝑁 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇 ⊆ 𝑁 such that 𝑆⋂𝑇 = 0, we have 𝑣(𝑆𝑈𝑇) ≥ 𝑣(𝑆) + 𝑣(𝑇). With a given value of a 
coalition, sharing of the value among the players is challenging. Cooperative game theory gives 
a solution concept that will be used to share this coalition. A vector 𝑥 ∈ 𝑅𝑁 is a solution 
concept, which represents a player 𝑁 allocation. Many solution concepts were proposed by 
cooperative game theory on what resulting to a fair solution, e.g. two symmetric (identical 
coalition contribution to the coalition) players that are based on solution concepts, different 
profit sharing is not considered a fair solution. Some notions that are commonly found in 
cooperative solution concept is described below [28], [55]. 
(1)  Individual Rationality 
An individual player does not receive less than he will obtain independently. 
(2) Efficiency 
The total values of the coalition must be equal to the participant’s distributed payoff. 
(3) Symmetry 
The player’s payoff is identical 
(4)  Zero allocation to dummy player 
A dummy player i.e., a player that has no contribution to the coalition receives zero value. 
A great attention has been placed on coalition and has been applied in this thesis, which will 
be discussed in the next section. 
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2.3.2.1   Coalition Formation 
A coalition game can be formulated by considering a distribution system that has a substation, 
which is connected to the utility grid and to micro-grids in the set 𝛮 [15]. A number of 
cooperation micro-grids  can be defined as a coalition S ⊆ 𝛮, which could be divided into two 
different groups i.e., the seller which is expressed as 𝑆𝑠 ⊂ S and the purchaser expressed 
by 𝑆𝑝 ⊂ S in such a way that 𝑆𝑠 ∪ 𝑆𝑝 = 𝑆. In each coalition, there may be an exchange of 
power between sellers in 𝑆𝑠  and the purchaser in 𝑆𝑝. 
The formulation of coalition can be expressed as a function of S and equilibrium point of both 
the sellers and the purchasers (i.e., the types of sellers that give power to the purchasers). The 
issue of reaching equilibrium between the sellers and purchasers is a challenging task to be 
addressed by the use of game theory techniques. Consider a coalition S and let 𝜏𝑠 be the set of 
ordering on the buyer in S.  With the order  Π 𝜖 𝜏𝑠, the losses incurred because of energy transfer 
between the members of S can be expressed by 
(S, Π) = −( ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝑖𝜖𝑆𝑠 𝑗𝜖𝑆𝑏 
+ ∑ 𝑃𝑖0
𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝑖 𝜖 𝑆𝑠
+  ∑ 𝑃𝑗 0   
𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝑗 𝜖 𝑆𝑝
 )                                                             (2.3) 
where 𝑃𝑖0
𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 and 𝑃𝑗0
𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠, respectively depict the power losses between the sellers and the 
purchaser and the utility grid during the energy distribution. 𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 represents the losses in the 
distribution line when there is energy transfer between sellers and purchasers, with certain 
considerations. First, the energy transfer between the seller 𝑖 𝜖 𝑆𝑠 and the buyer 𝑗 𝜖 𝑆𝑏 inside S 
will cause no transfer loss because of their closeness. In addition, inside S, energy transfer 
between the seller 𝑖 𝜖 𝑆𝑠 and the purchaser 𝑗 𝜖 𝑆𝑏 is done at low-to-medium voltage. 
Nguyen et al. [56], proposed deregulated power market where game theory approach was used 
to provide interaction among the interest groups. The coalition is formed by maximizing the 
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profits of the participants, which will enhance cooperation and mutual benefits. In [57], 
multilateral trades are proposed by the use of cooperative game theory to solve the coalition 
formation. Many solution concepts are used in cooperative game theory [58], but a great 
attention has been put on Shapley value and has been applied in many works, which will be 
discussed in the next section. 
2.3.2.2 The Shapley Value 
Payments are allocated to the players in coalition using a solution concept called Shapley value 
[51], [59]. In Shapley value, there is consideration of a player’s contribution to a coalition, 
which is called marginal contribution. The word marginal contribution refers to the amount 
that will shrink if a participant opts out of the game. 
By considering the notation used in section (2.2), we consider 𝑁 ∖ 𝑖 represent the set of players 
without the player 𝑖 and 𝑣: 2𝑁 ⟶ 𝑅 represents the characteristic function. We can now 
consider the player’s marginal contribution 𝑖 defined as 𝑣(𝑁) − 𝑣(𝑁 ∖ 𝑖). With the given 
marginal contribution, the Shapley value 𝜙𝑖is defined for a player 𝑥 ∈ 𝑁 as 
𝜙𝑖(𝑁, 𝑣) = ∑(|𝑆| ! |𝑁| − |𝑆| − 1)𝑁! [ 𝑣(𝑆𝑈𝑖) − 𝑣(𝑆)]                                                    (2.2) 
The characteristics of Shapley value include rationality, efficiency, symmetrical and zero 
allocation to dummy player [60]. In spite of this numerous advantages, Shapley value is said 
to be computationally complex, (2𝑛 × 2 × 0𝑣) where 0𝑣 is considered as a complex function 
and thus, becomes difficult to use as the number of participant increases [28]. Many solution 
concepts are used in cooperative  
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2.4   Bargaining Theory 
Bargaining theory can be described as a process of bargaining and its outcomes. This can also 
be referred to as bargaining problem [28]. According to Rubinstein [61], bargaining problem 
refers to the following situation and questions: 
Two individuals have before them several possible contractual agreements. Both have interests 
in reaching an agreement but their interests are not entirely identical. What will be agreed 
contract, assuming both parties behave rationally? 
For decades, economists had no answers to this bargaining problem. In order to tackle this 
challenge, Nash [62], and Rubinstein [61] presented axiomatic approach and strategic approach 
respectively to predict the outcomes of the bargaining problem. In this work, a review of both 
axiomatic and strategic bargaining solutions is provided. 
2.4.1   Axiomatic Bargaining 
Axiomatic bargaining theory uses a set of axioms to allocate payoff among the players. The 
approach was originated with Nash [62], and the players must satisfy certain axioms before the 
unanimous agreement.  He initiated and formulated a bargaining process between two players 
and ensure that a set of axioms are satisfied, which results in multiple solutions or unique 
solution. Some of the axioms are given as follows: 
(1)  Invariance to equivalent utility representations 
This axiom is otherwise referred to as scale-freeness or affine transformation. In this case, the 
bargaining solution must be invariant in respective of the rescaling of player’s utility function. 
(2)  Pareto Efficiency 
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This is also referred to as the Pareto optimal solution. This solution cannot be improved in any 
of the objectives without making at least one of the other objectives worse-off. 
(3)  Symmetry 
Symmetric solution should depend on utility function of the players and this utility function 
results in symmetric pay-offs i.e., the player’s payoff should be identical. 
(4)  Independent of relevant alternatives 
This is bargaining process. The axiom stipulates that in a choice set S, if a certain choice A is 
preferred over B, then the inclusion of another choice C should not make B preferable to A. 
Some Axiomatic bargaining solution and the axioms they satisfy will be considered in the 
following sections. 
2.4.1.1    Nash Bargaining Solution 
In cooperative game theory, Nash bargaining solution (NBS) can be used for fair cost/profit 
allocation. This bargaining solution must satisfy a set of axioms to ensure fair allocation. The 
interest of this approach is proportional fairness because the axioms consider user’s utilities. 
The NBS is applicable to general network topology so that the resources are allocated in a fair 
manner [63], [64]. The result obtained in this condition is linear with the equal payoff. On the 
other hand, there is a disagreement value, which is status-quo representation when the players 
fail to cooperate to reach mutual agreement. 
Let us consider two players A and B, which bargain over a set of utility functions, if they failed 
to reach the set agreement, then utility 𝑑𝐿, will be obtained by each of them, which is the 
disagreement point, denoted by 𝑑 = (𝑑𝐴, 𝑑𝐿). This disagreement point is the cooperation 
break down and otherwise called ‘threat’ [65], [66]. The agreement that is mutually beneficial 
is represented as 𝑥𝜖𝑋 such that 𝑈𝐴 (𝑥) > 𝑑𝐴 and 𝑈𝐿 (𝑥) > 𝑑𝐿. The above bargaining problem 
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represents a unique solution that has utilities represented by (𝑈𝐴
𝑁 , 𝑈𝐿
𝑁) which solves the 
problems as follows: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑈𝐴,𝑈𝐿(𝑈𝐴−𝑑𝐴) (𝑈𝐿−𝑑𝐿)                                                                                              (2.4) 
where  (𝑈𝐴−𝑑𝐴) (𝑈𝐿−𝑑𝐿) represents Nash product 
The maximization in (2.4) under the axiomatic bargaining theory gives a Pareto efficient 
allocation of a permit [67]. The previous section describes the axioms imposed by the axiomatic 
bargaining theory. The implications of these axioms are discussed in [50], [59], [66]. The most 
unrealistic axiom is symmetry; this is because it assumes the same negotiation power for all 
the players. The axiom can be relaxed with the use of asymmetric NBS, given its formulation 
as follows: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑈𝐴,𝑈𝐿(𝑈𝐴 − 𝑑𝐴)
𝛼 (𝑈𝐿 − 𝑑𝐿)
𝛽                                                                                     (2.5) 
where  𝛼 and  𝛽 are the bargaining powers of the players 
An increase in 𝛼 leads to an increase in utility of player A, and vice-versa. The resulting 
optimization problem in (2.5) is called asymmetric NBS [67], [66] or generalized NBS or non-
symmetric NBS [59], [66]. A generalized Nash bargaining solution depends on the bargaining 
power and therefore, no unique solution is obtained. However, all other axioms are satisfied. 
It is important to note that Nash solution does not depend on utility preferences but rather on 
the player’s preferences (i.e., Invariance to equivalent utility representation axiom). 
2.4.1.2    Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution 
Roth [68] describes that one of his axioms of independence of irrelevant alternatives has been 
a restrictive axiom for a solution and come under criticism. In the axiom, if some particular 
player prefer a solution in a set 𝑆, they must prefer a solution in a subset of 𝑆, as long as there 
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is a solution in subset 𝑆 [65]. However, a player could derive less satisfaction with its utility 
when there is enlargement in a solution set, this is shown in [69], [70]. Therefore, the extension 
of the NBS which negates this axiom is called Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. 
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution can be computed by forming a rectangular solution space R. The 
four rectangular points are obtained as follows: the status-quo point or disagreement point 
(𝑑𝑎, 𝑑𝑏) is the first point. The (𝑢𝑎∗, 0) is the second point, where from 𝑢𝑎∗ represents the 
maximum utility for the first player. The second player’s maximum utility forms the third 
point(𝑢𝑏∗, 0). Finally, a point that lies at (𝑢𝑎∗, 𝑢𝑏∗) forms the last point. A line is drawn from 
point (𝑑𝑎, 𝑑𝑏) which is the origin to (𝑢𝑎∗, 𝑢𝑏∗), which represent maximum utility for players 
A and B as shown in Figure 2.4. The point of intersection of Pareto frontier with the straight 
line obtained is Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. 
 
Figure 2.4: Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution [28] 
This approach is useful when the axiom of independent of relevant alternatives is not important. 
Discussion and examples of Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions are given in [71]. In the diagram, 
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Pareto-frontial is the solid line. The origin (i.e. (𝑑𝑎, 𝑑𝑏) = (0,0) is the disagreement point. In 
this case, all the points lie above this point represent the acceptable agreement. The dashed-
dotted line in the diagram is the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution (K-S). The point 
(𝑢𝑎∗, 0)  is the point at which a player A gets  maximum utility while player B gets maximum 
utility at point (𝑢𝑏∗, 0). The maximum utility for the players A and B is at the point (𝑢𝑎∗, 𝑢𝑏∗). 
The line K-S is drawn from the disagreement point to (𝑢𝑎∗, 𝑢𝑏∗).  At the point where the line 
intersects Pareto-frontial is the point of K-S solution 
2.4.1.3 Other Relevant Bargaining Solutions: Egalitarian and Utilitarian 
Solutions 
There are two different ways by which these bargaining solutions can be compared: 
(1)   The principle of equal gains: The argument is such that ‘this thing should be done for me 
because I am doing more for you’. This is referred to as egalitarian solution. 
(2)  The principle of greatest good: The debate on this case is that ‘this thing should be done 
for me because of the benefits to be derived more than it hurts you’. This is the concept of the 
utilitarian solution. 
Consider a two-person bargaining problem, the point (𝑥1, 𝑥2) 𝜖 𝐹 is the unique point of 
egalitarian solution, which must satisfy the condition of identical gain and must be weakly 
efficient in 𝐹 given as: 
𝑥1−𝑣1 = 𝑥2 − 𝑣2                                                                                                                (2.6) 
The idea is that the expression (𝑥1, 𝑥2) 𝜖 𝐹  is weakly efficient, if and only if there is no value 
(𝑦1, 𝑦2)  𝜖 𝐹 such that 𝑦1 > 𝑥1 and 𝑦2 > 𝑥2. A utilitarian solution works on the principle of 
the greatest good because it gives goods to the players that needed it most.  
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Hence, the egalitarian solution deals with the equal gain principle, while the utilitarian solutions 
are guided by the principle of good. Both violate the axiom of invariance to equivalent utility 
representation [72]. Utilitarian solutions are useful when the players are not self-interested 
because group utility is maximized by conceding goods to the player, which has the highest 
utility for them. The strategy bargaining will be described in the next section, as it predicts the 
outcome by taking bargaining process into consideration. 
2.4.2    The Strategy Bargaining 
This is a process of bargaining whereby players reached unanimous agreement. This type of 
bargaining tends to predict outcomes by considering the strategies of the players. The goal is 
to consider the game outcome (i.e. Nash equilibrium) of bargaining that results from the self-
enforcing interaction of the players. This is a non-cooperative game theory bargaining solution 
and has the solution concepts; the Nash equilibrium, dominant strategies and subgame perfect 
equilibrium, which will be defined as follows: 
(a)   Nash Equilibrium 
Nash equilibrium comes to play where neither player can unilaterally change her strategy. 
(b)   Dominant Strategy 
This states that no matter the strategy of other players, the dominant strategy is always at 
optimum. This implies that the highest payoff is achieved in dominant strategy. 
By comparison, Nash equilibrium (NE) deviates in a way to benefit the players (i.e., weaker 
notion of equilibrium) than the dominant strategy. Although, NE is relatively weaker at least 
one equilibrium point is achieved at every finite game. Selten’s subgame perfect NE happens 
to be a refinement of an NE for extension form game [28]. In extension form game, player 
makes a decision at every stage of the game. 
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(c)  Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium 
A strategy profile in an extensive form game is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if it 
represents an NE at every decision point.  In strategy bargaining, there is also another related 
concept that specifies that the bargaining rules is the notion of a bargaining protocol [28]. The 
alternating offers protocol is the bargaining protocol that has received wide attention, where 
the players make an offer in turn. Rubinstein’s pie dividing problem [61] tends to be the work 
that is most influential on the alternating offers protocol. The problem of the pie is the 
bargaining situation where mutual agreement by the two players is reached on the portion of 
shared resource. The players can suggest how the resource could be shared. When a player 
makes an offer, the bargaining continues whether or not the other players accept or reject it. 
The assumption of Rubinstein is that a complete information that is available for the players 
can make an alternative offer and no delay is tolerated. The dynamic game is modelled using 
Rubinstein’s bargaining process and the solution is obtained using backward induction method 
[67]. The player who makes the last move of the game is determined optimally by using the 
idea of backward induction method. By considering the last player action, the optimal strategy 
of last but one player is determined. This procedure continues until Nash equilibrium is 
determined for each subgame of the original game, thus obtained the subgame perfect NE of 
this game. 
2.4.3       Fair Settlement using Game Theory 
Game theory has been used to obtain a fair solution but fairness can be measured in many ways. 
In [73] , a fairness is defined as a process of arriving at an acceptable and reasonable outcome. 
The solution of fairness proposes that all players of game can receive a fair or acceptable 
portion of benefits. Salles, et al. in [74] proposed the use of lexicographic maximum criterion 
to guarantee fairness. The approach considered the fairness maximization of the benefit of the 
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worse-off individual. The solution of fairness suggests all the participants of game can receive 
a fair or justifiable portion of benefits. In [75], a classical production-planning problem in 
supply chain coordination is presented. The authors described a fairness as facilities burden 
sharing. The objective is for the absolute deviation maximization cost from the status-quo cost, 
which is considered a benchmark. In [76], a cooperative game to address a model for 
determining fair transfer prices in the supply chain is presented. In [77], a new profit-based 
security-constraint, unit commitment for industrial micro-grid is presented. The game theory 
using Shapley value method is proposed to minimize the final production cost by maximizing 
the profit of the factories when selling electricity to the main grid to obtain fair profit 
distribution. 
The cooperative game theory using Nash bargaining solution has been applied in different areas 
to obtain a ‘fair’ solution. Yaiche et al. in [63]   present a game theoretic framework to allocate 
bandwidth in high-speed network for the elastic services. The cooperative game theory, using 
Nash bargaining solution was proposed to provide the rate settings of the user that are Pareto 
optimal and consistent with the fairness axiom of game theory. In [78], a mathematical 
programming formulation for fair profit allocation between echelons in two-enterprise supply 
chain was presented. The authors considered the minimum profits of each participant and later 
obtained the objective function as the product of deviations from calculated and minimum 
benefit values. Gjerdrum, et al. in [79] also proposed a separable programming approach that 
uses game theoretic approach for fair profit settlement between supply chain partners. The 
paper uses Nash objective function to maximize the profit level of the enterprises. In [3], a 
game theory, Nash bargaining solution (NBS) was applied to minimize the cost of micro-grid 
for mutual cost distribution among the MG participants. Hao Wang et al. [18] presented the 
Nash bargaining theory to achieve fair profit sharing and energy trading among micro-grids. In 
[47], a multi-objective power management is modelled as a bargaining game. The proposed 
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work uses game theory, Nash bargaining solution to find a unique and fair solution among 
different agents on the Pareto front of the optimization problem. 
Cooperative game theory using generalized Nash bargaining solution has been applied in few 
areas to obtain a fair weighted solution. In [80], fair profit allocation supply chain optimization 
is proposed using revenue sharing policy to ensure total profit allocation and interest of 
individual participants in the supply chain is aligned so that overall supply chain performance 
is maximized. The approach uses generalized Nash type objective function, which takes into 
account the negotiation power of each participant in biofuel supply chain. In [81], a bargaining 
game based on one-pass RC scheme used for spatial H.264/SVC is presented. The optimal bit 
allocation solution is achieved using the generalized Nash bargaining solution obtained based 
on bargaining powers. Touati, C. et al. in [64] proposed a simple parametrization of the utility 
function using quadratic functions. A fairness approach is considered using generalized Nash 
bargaining solution for bandwidth allocation. It takes into account each connection of the 
assigned throughput and the utility that throughput represents. 
In this thesis, a cooperative game theory using Nash bargaining solution with negotiation power 
is proposed to ensure fair profits distribution amongst the participants of micro-grid. The 
problem is nonlinear objective function, which is solved by using TLBO to optimize the 
product of the difference between the participant profits and the lower profits (i.e. status-quo 
profit). 
2.5 Summary 
In the chapter, the review of microsources related to energy management problem that is 
adequate for electricity in sites in remote communities has been presented. These microsources 
include diesel generator, renewable generation and energy storage system. A micro-grid is 
presented, in relation to the production of the local power generation, load consumptions and 
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electricity price in the main grid. Both the axiomatic bargaining and strategic bargaining 
approaches to predict the outcomes of the bargaining problems are reviewed and discussed. 
Finally, fair settlement using game is reviewed. Based on the overview of existing works, a 
conclusion is drawn on the concept of cooperative game theory to address EMS and insight 
from the bargaining theory is utilized to address the problem of EMS in MG. 
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Chapter 3 
Modelling of Micro-grid Components 
Although modelling is not part of the contribution of the thesis but because the solar PV, 
battery and diesel generator are the main DERs used in the system and therefore need to be 
seriously considered. 
This chapter introduces the modelling of components of micro-grid. In this research, the 
components to be modelled include solar PV system, energy storage system, diesel generator 
and the load.  
3.1 Modelling of Solar PV Module 
The optimum value of load is attained at a point where the power generated by PV cell is the 
maximum [82]. In a PV module, there are several number of series connected PV cells to ensure 
more energy is received than that which is converted by a single PV cell. The highest possible 
electrical efficiency is strived to be achieved by manufacturer of PV module by ensuring that 
the fabrication parameters of the PV cells are optimized. The current voltage (I/V) 
characteristic is one of the most characterization methods applied for PV cells, which is the 
main important parameters required of the PV module [82], [83]. 
3.1.1 Solar PV Module 
A combination of solar cells forms a photovoltaic PV module, which may be in series or in 
parallel connection. Figure 3.1 shows the solar cell connections in a PV module. Both the solar 
cell module and PV module have a similar behavioural model. 
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Figure 3.1: Solar cell connection in a PV module [84] 
The behaviour of photovoltaic module is similar to the model of a solar cell. In a solar PV 
module, a series connection of appropriate number of solar cells increase the voltage while a 
parallel connection increases the current. When the solar cell is short circuited, the voltage 
across such solar cell is zero, thus, the current through the solar cell at that time is called short 
circuit current. The generation and collection of light generated carriers are due to the short 
circuit current. Therefore, the largest current to be drawn from solar cell is short circuit current. 
On the other hand, open voltage occurs at zero current, that is, when the solar cell voltage is at 
maximum. The amount of solar cell forward bias due to the bias of the solar cell junction with 
current due to the light generator corresponds to open circuit voltage. 
The following equations are the derived solar cell equations 
                                                𝐼𝑀𝑠𝑐 = 𝑁𝑀𝑝𝐼𝑠𝑐                                                                     (3.1)                                                                      
                                               𝑉𝑀𝑜𝑐 = 𝑁𝑀𝑠𝑉𝑜𝑐                                                                     (3.2)                             
                                                𝐼𝑀𝑚𝑝 = 𝑁𝑀𝑝𝐼𝑚                                                                    (3.3) 
                                                 𝑉𝑀𝑚𝑝 = 𝑁𝑀𝑠𝑉𝑚                                                                  (3.4) 
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                                                  𝑅𝑀𝑠 = 𝑁𝑀𝑠𝑅𝑠/𝑁𝑚𝑃                                                           (3.5) 
where 𝑀 means module, 𝐼𝑀𝑠𝑐 is the PV module short circuit current of a solar PV module, 𝑁𝑀𝑝 
is the number of parallel cells in PV module, 𝑉𝑀𝑜𝑐 is the PV open circuit voltage of PV module, 
𝐼𝑀𝑚𝑝 is the PV module maximum power point (MPP) current, 𝑉𝑀𝑚𝑝 is the PV module MPP 
voltage and 𝑅𝑀𝑠 is the PV module series resistance (Ω).  
3.1.2     Solar PV Array 
A photovoltaic array has the characteristics similar to the one obtained in the photovoltaic 
module and solar cells. In this case, a combination of a PV module forms a PV array, which 
can be in series and in parallel connections. Figure 3.2 shows the connection of solar PV 
modules in a PV array. Both the PV array model and model of PV modules bear the same 
resemblance in behavioural model. The equations for the derived solar PV array is the same as 
those of the PV module, except for the use of an index A to replace index M, which stands for 
the array. The equations below are the PV array current and voltage equations [84].  
                                  𝐼𝐴𝑠𝑐 = 𝑁𝐴𝑝𝐼𝑠𝑐 = 𝑁𝑀𝑝𝑁𝐴𝑝𝐼𝑠𝑐                                                             (3.6) 
                                 𝑉𝐴𝑜𝑐 = 𝑁𝐴𝑠𝑉𝑀𝑜𝑐 = 𝑁𝑀𝑠𝑁𝐴𝑠𝑉𝑜𝑐                                                          (3.7) 
                                  𝐼𝐴𝑚𝑝 = 𝑁𝐴𝑝𝐼𝑚 = 𝑁𝑀𝑝𝑁𝐴𝑝𝐼𝑚                                                            (3.8) 
                                   𝑉𝐴𝑚𝑝 = 𝑁𝐴𝑠𝑉𝑚 = 𝑁𝑀𝑠𝑁𝐴𝑠𝑉𝑚                                                           (3.9) 
                                  𝑅𝐴𝑠 =
𝑁𝐴𝑠𝑅𝑠
𝑁𝐴𝑝
=   
𝑁𝑀𝑠𝑁𝐴𝑠𝑅𝑠
𝑁𝑀𝑝𝑁𝐴𝑝
                                                                  (3.10) 
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Figure 3.2: The Connection of Solar PV Modules in a PV Array [84]. 
3.1.3    Maximum Power Point Tracking 
The power generated by PV module depends on the light intensity radiated by the sun. The 
maximum power point (MPP) of the PV array is the power at which the solar radiates maximum 
possible power, which is indicated in I-V and P-V characteristics curves. The maximum power 
is stochastic in nature and has to do with irradiance and temperature of the solar PV. Therefore, 
to utilize PV power efficiently, the use of the maximum power tracking (MPPT) comes to play 
[84], [85]. Figure 3.3 shows the basic principle of MPPT 
 
(a) The Solar PV Power System   (b) I-V and P-V Characteristics curve of the solar PV cell                                                                                                         
Figure 3.3: The Basic Principle of MPPT [84].   
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The maximum power is delivered to the load by incorporating a DC-DC converter with an 
MPPT algorithm. As shown in Figure 3.3b, the two arrows indicate that the actual point can be 
tracked on either side so that maximum power can be obtained. 
The main function of MPPT algorithm is to monitor the performance of MPP as the operating 
system condition changes. This can be achieved by ensuring that solar PV array terminal 
voltage is manipulated. Many algorithms can be applied to an MPPT; prominent among them 
are the constant voltage method, incremental conductance method, and non-linear function 
solution method. The type of algorithm that is applied to the application of  MPPT in the thesis 
is incremental conductance algorithm, this is because of its high efficiency as it does not lead 
to excessive computational burdens. 
3.2 Modelling of Battery 
The solar PV is intermittent in nature and depends on solar irradiation during the day, but the 
load demand variation does not depend on availability of sunlight. The role of distributed 
storage sources is to ensure continuity of power supply to the load. Different forms of energy 
storage exists, such as flywheel, capacitor, and battery. The battery storage device is considered 
the most common type of storage widely in use, thus, it is used in this work. 
In renewable energy system, lead acid battery is commonly used [84], [86]. Although, there 
are other types of batteries, some of them are off-shelf items and are more expensive. Prominent 
among them are lithium-ion (𝐿𝑖 − 𝑖𝑜𝑛), nickel-cadmium (𝑁𝑖𝐶𝑑) and nickel-metal-hydride 
(𝑁𝑖𝑀𝐻). For the energy storage element, the selection of lead-acid battery depends on its 
characteristics and the costs. 
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3.2.1    Characteristics of Battery 
The lead-acid battery is made of two plates, anode (positive) and cathode (negative). The 
negative is composed of lead (𝑃𝑏), while the positive is made of lead dioxide (𝑃𝑏02). 
At the charging mode, the flow of current into the battery is at the positive terminal, thus, there 
is a gradual increase in battery voltage and store charge. While decreasing, when in discharging 
mode and the flow of current out of the battery is at the positive terminal. For a battery to be in 
a better position, there are undercharge mode and overcharge mode [84], [86]. 
For the undercharge mode, the battery charge has gone below the minimum recommended 
value and the circuit conditions enabling the discharge of the battery. The action of battery in 
this mode results in a fast reduction of the electrolyte internal density, which result in forming 
sediments at the bottom of the battery element. In this case, there is a reduction in capacity of 
battery and this may lead to irreversible damage [84], [86]. For the overcharge mode, the 
battery has gone beyond the recommended maximum value and stores no more charges at this 
time. This will reduce the capacity of the battery and will reach saturation by further charging. 
The characteristics of batteries with different mode of operations are shown in Figure 3.4. 
  The following three main parameters are specifically used to rate and define a battery [84]: 
1. the nominal capacity of the battery 𝐶𝑏 
2. the rate of charge and discharge 
3. the state of charge 
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Figure 3.4: The characteristics of Battery with Different mode of Operation [84]. 
The nominal charge, which a battery can store, is referred to as the nominal capacity. This is 
normally specified by the manufacturers. At a given period and a given discharge rate, and 
temperature, the charge delivered by a battery is called measured parameter. The time of charge 
is related to the battery nominal capacity. The following hours represent the discharge duration 
provided by the manufacturers, 5hours, 10hours, and 100hours.  
The charge and discharge rates of a battery are the relationship between the nominal capacity 
and the charge or discharge current. At constant current, the time the battery takes to discharge 
is called the discharge rate of the battery, while the charge rate is the duration it takes to charge 
up at a constant current. The state of charge SOC is discussed in [87], [88]. The variation of 
the charge is taken into consideration and is expressed in terms of temperature and current [88]. 
The battery SOC is expressed as follows [88]:  
                                            𝑆𝑂𝐶 =
𝐶(𝑡)
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑓(𝑡)
                                                                      (3.11) 
where 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑓(𝑡) is the reference capacity of battery, 𝐶(𝑡) is the battery capacity. 
 State of Health (SOH) 
The battery state of health is expressed as follows [88]:  
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                                                𝑆𝑂𝐻(𝑡) =
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑓(𝑡)
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑛𝑜𝑚
                                                            (3.12) 
where  𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑛𝑜𝑚 is the normal reference capacity of battery as provided by manufacturer data. 
At each step size, if the battery’s capacity is a discharge, the reference capacity can now be 
expressed as 
                                          𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑓(𝑡) = 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑓(𝑡 + ∆𝑡) − ∆𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑓(𝑡)                                      (3.13) 
where ∆𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑓(𝑡) is the losses of reference capacity which according to depth of discharge are 
considered linear [87]. 
The losses are calculated as follows: 
                             ∆𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑓(𝑡) = 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑛𝑜𝑚. 𝑍(𝑆𝑂𝐶(𝑡 − ∆𝑡) − 𝑆𝑂𝐶(𝑡))                             (3.14) 
The SOH can be deduced from (3.12), (3.13), and (3.14) as follows:   
                           𝑆𝑂𝐻(𝑡) =
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑓(𝑡−∆𝑡)
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑛𝑜𝑚
− 𝑍(𝑆𝑂𝐶(𝑡 − ∆𝑡) − 𝑆𝑂𝐶(𝑡))                           (3.15) 
where Z is the linear ageing coefficient. 
3.3  Modelling of Diesel Generator 
Many methods were proposed for the modelling of diesel generator [89], [90], [91], [92]. The 
fuel supplied to the diesel generator to maintain a specific range of speed can be regulated 
through an engine governor working as a sensor by comparing the difference between the 
actual speed and the desired speed. If a different exists, a speed command is given to adjust the 
governor setting and the speed will be maintained within the specific range. 
A model of the fuel actuator system is represented using a first order phase-lag in which the 
network is characterized by time constant 𝜏2 actuator torque constant 𝐾2. The fuel flow given 
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by ∅(𝑠) in (3.16) is shown in Figure 3.5. This represents the output of the actuator, having the 
input current 𝐼𝑠 
                                    ∅(𝑠) =
𝐾3𝐾2
1+𝜏2𝑆
 𝐼𝑠                                                                  (3.16) 
where 𝐾3 is the current driver’s torque constant. 
After a time delay, 𝜏1 and torque engine constant, there is a conversion of fuel flow into 
mechanical torque 𝑇(𝑠), which is represented by transfer function model of (3.17) as shown in 
Figure 3.6.  Typical values for 𝐾1,  𝐾2 and 𝐾3 are given as 1.15pu, 1pu and 1pu respectively 
[90].  
                     𝑇(𝑠) = ∅(𝑠)𝐾1𝑒
𝜏1𝑆                                                                       (3.17) 
where  𝐾1 is the engine torque constant. 
 
 
                 
Figure 3.5: The Model of Actuator and the current driver constant  
                                             
Figure 3.6: The Engine Model [92] 
The speed of the engine is automatically controlled by mechanical or electromechanical device, 
known as ‘governor’. Many types of governors exist, such as direct mechanical, 
microprocessor based, mechanical-hydraulic, and electro-hydraulic electronics [92], [93]. The 
complex dynamic effects of parameters, which are represented by ‘flywheel’, are angular speed 
of flywheel 𝑤𝑚, the inertial, the loaded alternator, and the viscous friction coefficient 𝜌. The 
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model of the system is able to filter out noise effect and large proportion of the disturbance by 
the use of an integrator with flywheel accelerator constant 𝐽. In [90], an integrator is proposed 
to be inserted in between reference signal and engine actuator. Figure 3.7 represents diesel 
engine system block diagram, which indicate the way of eliminating the speed drop. In this 
case, the speed drop in the steady state operation needs to be eliminated by ensuring that the 
order of the whole system is raised.  
 
Figure 3.7: The Block Diagram of Diesel Engine System [92] 
For a set up of a particular engine, the values of 𝐾2 and 𝐾3 are kept constant. The parameter 𝐾3 
represents the gain that determines the amount of mechanical torque obtained per unit of fuel 
flow. The temperature of the oil that is flowing to the actuator depends on time constant 𝜏2. 
The variation of variables 𝐾2 and 𝜏2 is negligible at certain interval [90]. The torque of engine 
multiplied by a time delay is commonly represented by a combustion system [90], [92], [94]. 
There are three components of the dead time:  
 The ‘power stroke delay’ is the time from which there is a change in actuator signal 
until any cylinder has fuel injected to it. 
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 The analogous of characteristics ‘combustion delay’ which is the time taken to burn the 
fuel in a cylinder in order to produce a torque output. 
 The effect of multi-cylinder nature of the prime-mover, which represents the time taken 
to produce the required number of cylinder for a new torque level to allocate to the 
prime-mover. 
3.4     Load Modelling 
There is complexity in modelling a load because of the large number of connected appliances 
such as heater, refrigerator, and air conditioner. Therefore, modelling of exact load tends to be 
difficult. Moreover, many factors such as the weather condition, time of the day and economy 
contribute to the load changes [95], [88]. Two types of load model are identified: the static 
model and dynamic model [95]. When modelling load in a static condition, it is always 
modelled in terms of magnitude and frequency of bus at that instant. 
The load modelling is used in areas of the voltage stability, long-term stability and inter-area 
oscillations [95], [88]. Statistics of basic electricity demand profile as adapted from [3] is 
shown in Table 3.1. This table presents statistics data of annual electricity demand. The 
residential building has the highest annual electricity demand and the same time highest peak 
power demand, which occurs between the periods of 6.00pm to 10.00pm, when workers return 
home from work. In addition, the lowest annual electricity demand is fire station and at the 
same time having the lowest peak power demand, which occurs between the periods of 9.00am 
to 6pm as shown in appendix A. 
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Table 3.1: Statistics Data of Annual Electricity Demand. 
 
Schoo
l 
Hotel Restauran
t 
Fire 
Station 
Residential 
Building 
Hospital Total 
Annual Electricity 
Demand (kW) 
49859 66028.5 90082 37631.5 68036 45004.5 456641.5 
Electricity Peak 
Demand (kW) 
10.7 11.6 17.7 6.8 18.6 7.2 0 
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CHAPTER 4 
Optimization Model for Energy      
Management 
The problems associated with the classical optimization methods have led to the development 
of non-conventional methods. The traditional methods can be divided into two distinct 
methods: direct search methods and gradient-based methods. These optimization methods are 
used to solve a large number of problems in engineering and are popular because they are 
efficiently used in solving problems with many design variables [96]. Some of these methods 
are very slow and requires many evaluation functions for the system to converge. Classical 
methods usually have a solution either exists or does not exist. These methods cannot cope 
with the uncertainty because the main feature of the application of these approaches is 
unpredictable and uncertain [96]. 
Generally, the disadvantages of the nonlinear and non-convex programming are the complexity 
of the design and convergence problems. For example, in Newton based technique, the system 
may fail if the initial conditions are not properly selected and therefore no convergence is 
achieved. In interior point method, the solution may not be feasible in its non-linear domain; 
this also has the problem of initial conditions, the termination problems and may not be able to 
solve nonlinear problems [97]. While solving complex problems, the classical methods are 
often trapped in a local optimum. 
Lambda-iteration method is considered as one of the most popular traditional techniques to 
solve minimization and maximization problems in economic load dispatch [98]. It gives a 
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decentralized solution to economic load dispatch method [99]. The method relies on local 
optimum solution convergence or divergence altogether. The procedure first assumes the 
starting value of Lambda and a small change in Lambda. Penalty factor and total profit is 
evaluated. Then, iteration is performed several times to obtain the solution. However, the 
Lambda iteration method has a slow convergence (as it converges slowly) [100]. To worsen 
the situation, the algorithm exhibits pathological behaviour, which implies that the correct 
solution is reached a long time after the solution has been stabilized [99]. 
 The heuristic methods can be divided into different distinct groups based on different 
considerations such as iteration based, population based, deterministic, etc. The methods 
developed are in two groups: swarm algorithms and evolutionary algorithms. There are 
different variants of evolutionary algorithms such as genetic algorithm (GA), differential 
evolution (DE), evolutionary strategy (ES), and evolutionary programming (EP). For the 
swarm algorithms, there are particle swarm optimization (PSO), Artificial bee colony (ABC), 
shuffled frog leaping (SFL), ant colony optimization (ACO), algorithm, etc., are typical 
examples [101], [102]. 
The population size, elite size, and number of generations/iterations are the parameters used in 
GA and PSO algorithms, which constitute the common controlling parameters. In addition, 
they also required specific control parameters for their individual algorithms. In GA, for 
instance, the use mutation rate and crossover probability are employed, whereas PSO uses 
inertia weight as well as cognitive social and parameters [103]. It is important that the algorithm 
specific-parameters be properly tuned as lack of proper tuning may result in solution being 
trapped at local optimal. The latest approach of PSO and GA are not chosen because we want 
to compare the “standard” TLBO to the standard GA and PSO for consistency.  
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Genetic algorithm is a heuristic evolutionary algorithm that obtains optimal solution through a 
search space. GA has a unique feature of a procedure for searching a solution. The GA is a 
powerful tool that obtains the best solution by creating a population of possible solutions to a 
particular problem through a number of generations [104], [105]. GA works through three 
processes: selection, crossover, and mutation. The selection operator determines the likely 
times the chromosome will be chosen to reproduce [100]. 
The GA works; coding space (genotype) and solution space (phenotype) through two 
alternative spaces [106]. In GA, mapping of the object variables to a string code is represented 
by encoding function and decoding function is used to represent mapping of string code to its 
object variable. Encoding can be classified into 1-dimensional and 2-dimesional depending on 
the structure of encoding. The 1-dimensinal types are binary, octal, hexadecimal, permutation 
and value encoding, while 2-dimensional type is Tree encoding [106], [107]. 
Binary encoding is most common form of encoding, which is used in this research work. A 
binary structure is used to represent each chromosome.      
The procedures in solving problems in GA are as follows 
1. Determine a population. 
2. Perform the following operations until the system converges. 
a. Determine a new-pop, which is referred to as empty pop 
b. Perform the following operation when new-pop is still having space. 
i. One at a time, randomly select two individuals from pop one at a time,  
ii. To produce new individuals by using crossover operator. 
c. Randomize the process of individual in new-pop which will change one part of 
generation i.e. mutation 
d. Get a new-pop to dislodge the old pop. 
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3. With highest fitness value, the individual from pop should be selected as the solution 
to the problem. 
The population is always taken as a candidate solution in the algorithm. A single solution 
is otherwise called individual in a population. The measure of fitness of an individual is 
based on good performance of the solution represented by the individuals. The process of 
selection is comparable favourably to the survival of the fittest. Selection of fitness for 
crossover depends on the selection process. The fitness of the individual depends on the 
survival of the individual from one generation to another. The production of two new 
individuals is because of crossover, which occurs due to the mixing of the solution together. 
There is tendency for each individual to mutate during each generation, which may cause 
the individual to change. 
In this work, the GA uses the real value coding. The main operations of GA are as follows: 
1. Population: 
The possible solutions of population are created in the algorithm to obtain the 
best solution by evolving over multiple generations. 
2. Fitness 
In this thesis, we tried to maximize the participant’s profits. When the profit is 
higher the fitness of the participants will be correspondingly higher. To achieve 
the fitness, we ranked the solution in order of ‘best’ to ‘worst’. 
3. Selection 
In this operator, the solutions are selected from the current population, which in 
turn form the next population of solutions. This work uses as much as possible, 
a convergence and a small building simulation. From the population, n-solutions 
and the winner solution are selected randomly by the tournament operators, 
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thus, exhibiting a better ranking, out of the tournament for necessary 
recombination. 
4. Crossover 
The mixing of genetic information’ is being controlled by recombination 
operators which are obtained from the paired individuals through a process 
known as ‘crossover’. This occurs when the bits value between the two 
individuals are swapped. In this work, efforts are made to use uniform crossover 
operator and each pair of bits (i.e. the number of bits swapped will be an average 
of 50%) swaps a probability of 50% 
5. Mutation 
In mutation operation, the genetic diversity is maintained from one generation 
of a population of genetic algorithm chromosomes to the next. From the 
previous solution, in mutation, there may be a change in solution.  In this case, 
better solution is achieved by using mutation. One or more gene values in 
chromosomes are altered by mutation from its initial state. GA uses the operator 
to produce a better solution. In this work, the values of the gene were replaced 
with a uniform random value by using the non-uniform mutation type. 
6. Elitism 
Elitism is used to automatically re-initialize the search whenever there is a 
collapse of the population to form a single solution. This, in essence, is used to 
guarantee the continuity of the search until simulation reaches a specific value. 
In this thesis, a population size of 60, the number of generation is 300 were used and the 
rationale behind choosing these parameters is justified in the simulation results describe in 
section 5.7. The flowchart for general GA is shown in Figure 4.1 
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                        Figure 4.1: Flowchart for Genetic Algorithm 
Particle swarm optimization technique is a population-based optimization technique and is 
inspired by a social behaviour of bird flocking or school fishing [23], [108], [109].  The 
particles are initialized in PSO, in the search space. For each particle in the swarm, the first 
thing is to ensure that the initial position of the particle is updated and later evaluate the 
objective function. The movement of particle in the search space is determined using the best 
solution (𝑝𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡) of the individual particle, swarm particle’s best solution (𝑔𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡). After 
moving all the particles, the next generation/iteration commences. Optimal solution will be 
moved like a flock of bird searching for food. The flowchart for general PSO is given in Figure 
4.2 
 
 
Start
Specify the parameter 
for GA
Generate the Initial Population
Time Domain Simulation
Gen = 1
Find the fitness of each article 
in the current population
Gen > Max Gen Stop
Yes
Apply GA operators; 
Selection, Crossover
and Mutation
No
Gen = Gen +1
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Figure 4.2: Flowchart for Particle Swarm Optimization 
The general equations (4.1) and (4.2) given below are used to update the velocity and new 
position. 
            𝑣𝑖(𝑡 + 1) = 𝑣𝑖(𝑡) + 𝑐1𝑟1(𝑝𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 − 𝑥𝑖 (𝑡) + 𝑐2𝑟2(𝑔𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 − 𝑥𝑖 (𝑡))                             (4.1) 
                               𝑥𝑖(𝑡 + 1) = 𝑥𝑖(𝑡) + 𝑣𝑖 (𝑡 + 1)                                                              (4.2) 
where 𝑟1and 𝑟2 represent random selected number between 0 and 1, 𝑐1, and 𝑐2 are the inertia 
parameters, 𝑥𝑖 is the particle position during iteration. The use of 𝑝𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 and 𝑔𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 make the 
velocity of each particle to update by using equation (4.2).    
The main goal of this energy management is to develop the MG with many participants (which 
could be residential and commercial loads) to utilize the resources efficiently by cooperating 
with each other for mutual benefits. Figure 4.3 shows different participant’s sites of micro-grid  
Start
Specify the parameter 
for PSO
Generate the Initial Population
Time Domain Simulation
Iter = 1
Find the fitness of each article 
in the current population
Iter > Max Iter Stop
Yes
Update the particle position 
and velocity
No
Iter = Iter+1
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#  
Figure 4.3: Participants of a Micro-grid [3] 
.  In this chapter, an optimization formulation and model that could be used in energy 
management based on different market policies are described. Game theory based on the 
generalized NBS is used to obtain fair allocation of utility. Lastly, the application TLBO 
algorithm for solving energy management problem is presented. 
4.1 Optimization formulation 
In this research, an optimization problem has been developed. A micro-grid, which involved 6 
participant’s sites, is considered. The sites are school, hotel, restaurant, fire station, residential 
building and hospital. For each of the participant’s sites, the following information is used: 
 an hourly load forecasting 
 equivalent lifetime lower profit 𝐸𝑃𝐿or status-quo profit 
 solar PV generation hourly forecasting 
 energy resources, e.g. diesel generator, solar PV, and battery storage source. 
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 a grid-connected mode, which enables energy import and export 
 an islanded mode, which enables MG to manage its own local generation 
Energy production is modelled by using the following information: 
 the period of the day is partitioned into a number of reasonable intervals 
 electricity demand profile on an hourly basis for each participant 
 the battery charge and discharge rate 
 weighting factors for day type (this will enable the model to accommodate a certain 
number of days in winter and summer periods) 
 different transfer prices and negotiation power indicator 
The optimization problem is formulated based on the assumed market scenarios as adapted 
from [88]. In the first scenario, the assumption is that there is a connection from MG to the 
main grid and therefore, controls the power, thus, there is power exchange between the main 
grid and the MG. In the second scenario, the MG is islanded and has no connection with the 
main grid but has diesel generator as back up. 
Market Scenario 1 
In this scenario, there is energy exchange between the main grid and the MG, i.e., purchase and 
sales of power from/to the main grid. The expectation of MG is to maximize the profit from 
the power trade with the main grid. The micro-grid central controller has the following 
information [88], [110]. 
 the price of electricity purchased from the main grid is fixed at $0.17 and the price sold 
to the main grid is fixed at $0.0131 as adopted from [3]. 
 demand of power by each participant’s site 
 the bids for each participant’s site 
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The micro-grid central controller provides 
 micro-sources set points for each site in the MG 
 energy exchange between the participants of MG 
 power bought from the main grid 
 power sold to the main grid 
The objective function is to maximize the total profits of all the participants of MG 
                                 𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝑓(𝑥) = (𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 − 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒))                                               (4.3) 
The Micro-grid central controller (MGCC) transferred energy within the MG at an agreed 
transfer price.  The MGCC also sells excess energy to the main grid. If the local generation in 
the MG cannot cope with the load demand, the main grid will sell energy to the MG and in turn 
will sell to the MG participants. The income is calculated as follows: 
                                  Income =𝐴1 ∑ 𝑋𝑠   + 𝐴1 
𝑁
𝑠=1 ∑ 𝑋𝑦   
𝑁
𝑠=1                                                    (4.4) 
where  𝐴1is the price of the active power selling to the grid (in $/kW), 𝑋𝑠 is the active power 
of DERs ( in kW) that is sold to the grid, 𝑋𝑦 is the active power of DERs that is sold to other 
players.  
The expenses referred to the amount of power sold to the MG from the main grid, the costs of 
active production power consumed, cost of the power transfer from other players. This is 
expressed as 
        Expenses=𝐴2 ∑ 𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑋𝑑 + 𝐴2𝑋𝑔 + 
𝑁
𝑠=1 𝐴2 ∑ 𝑡𝑎𝑏 𝑋𝑝 
𝑁
𝑠=1                                                    (4.5) 
where 𝑡𝑎𝑏 is the total active bid, 𝑋𝑑 is the production power (active power) of the DERs 
consumed (kW), 𝑋𝑔 is the active power purchased from main grid (kW), 𝑋𝑝 is the active power 
purchase from other players (kW) 
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In this case, we can express the objective function as follows 
 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 (𝐴1 ∑ 𝑋𝑠 + ∑ 𝐴1. 𝑋𝑦 
𝑁
𝑠=1 − 𝐴2 
𝑁
𝑠=1 (∑  𝑎𝑏 𝑋𝑑 + 𝑋𝑔 +
𝑁
𝑠=1 ∑ 𝑡𝑎𝑏 𝑋𝑝)) 
𝑁
𝑠=1           (4.6)    
Where ab is the active bid                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
The constraints for the optimization are 
 limits of micro-generations 
 the active power balance of the system in MG 
           ∑ 𝑋𝑑   + 𝑋𝑔 + 
𝑁
𝑠=1 ∑ 𝑋𝑝   =
𝑁
𝑠=1 𝑃𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑                                                                   (4.7) 
Market Scenario 2 
In this scenario, the MGCC is islanded and uses its local generation only to meet the active 
power demand. MGCC is provided with the following: 
 the demand for active power 
 the price for both active power supply and demand 
 the demand bids 
where 
                                    Income =  𝐴1 ∑ 𝑋𝑦   
𝑁
𝑠=1                                                                   (4.8) 
The expense in this case is the total costs of active power generated, cost of the power 
transferred from other players and the other relevant costs. 
                    𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 = ∑ 𝑡𝑎𝑏 (𝐴2𝑋𝑑 + 𝐴2𝑋𝑝 ) 
𝑁
𝑠=1                                                                        (4.9) 
The optimization problem constraints are given as follows: 
 technical micro-sources limits, which contain maximum and minimum bounds of 
operation. 
58 
 
 active power balance of the system in islanded MG 
                         ∑ 𝑋𝑑   + 
𝑁
𝑠=1 ∑ 𝑋𝑝   
𝑁
𝑠=1 = 𝑃𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑                                                  (4.10) 
where 𝑃𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 is the active power load demand 
4.2 Optimization of Energy management of MG 
Maximization of the profit of all the participants is the main objective function. It consists of 
costs of necessary payment and initial investment of the project throughout the lifetime of the 
installation. In this case, we considered the lifetime of components to be the same apart from 
battery storage unit (since it needs replacement during the project lifetime). In this thesis, we 
proposed the annual cost of the systems with the following elements [88]. 
 The cost of installation of solar PV system, diesel generator and battery unit 
 The cost of replacement of battery during the project lifetime. 
 The battery and solar PV maintenance costs. 
 The cost of fuel consumption for diesel generator during the project lifetime. 
 The operation and maintenance cost of diesel generator. 
In islanded mode, the diesel generators, solar PVs and battery storage units meant for the 
participants of micro-grid in the sites have been employed, whereas in the grid-connected mode 
diesel generator is absent. In the grid-connected mode, the possibility of transferring excess 
energy produced from one site to another or sold to the main grid at a certain agreed price is 
considered. In the next subsection, the objective function, constraints, and TLBO approach for 
energy management will be considered in both grid-connected and islanded mode. 
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4.2.1 Objective Function 
A   Economic Model in grid-connected mode 
Before considering the objective function, we need to first obtain the system annual income 
and annual cost.      
In grid-connected mode, the distributed energy resources used are the solar PV, battery storage 
unit and the main grid.  
 (a)   Annual income of the system in grid-connected mode 
Energy is transferred within the MG participants and the excess is sold to the utility grid with 
the agreed price. The term ‘income’ is estimated as follows: 
                           𝐼𝑔𝑠= 𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑔𝑠 + 𝑆𝐶. 𝐺𝐸𝑆                                                                      (4.11) 
where 𝐼𝑔𝑠 is the total income of the participants,  𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑔𝑠 is the transfer micro-grid selling cost 
in grid-connected mode for site s, 𝑆𝐶 is the sell coefficient, and 𝐺𝐸𝑆 is the grid electricity 
selling price to the main grid. 
                          𝐺𝐸𝑆 = ∑ 𝐶𝑒𝑡,𝑝 𝑊𝑝𝑇𝑡𝐸𝑡𝑝𝑠                                                                   (4.12) 
where 𝐶𝑒 is the price of exported electricity to the grid, 𝑊𝑝 is the weight of day t, 𝑇𝑡 is the time 
duration of each time period p, and 𝐸𝑡𝑝𝑠 is the electricity exported to the grid. 
                       𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑔𝑠 = ∑ 𝑊𝑝𝑡,𝑝,𝑠′ 𝑇𝑡𝐸𝑠𝑠′𝑦𝑡𝑝𝑠𝑠′                                                             (4.13) 
where 𝐸𝑠𝑠′ is the electricity transfer price from site s to site s’ and 𝑦𝑡𝑝𝑠𝑠′ is the electricity 
transferred on day t at time p from site s to site s’ 
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(b)   Annual cost of the system in grid-connected mode 
The system annual micro-grid cost (𝐴𝐶𝑔𝑠) in the grid-connected mode for site, s includes the 
annual capital cost (𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑠), annual operation and maintenance cost (𝐴𝑂𝑀𝑔𝑠), annual 
replacement cost (𝐴𝑅𝐶𝑔𝑠), the MG buying cost (𝑇𝐵𝑆𝑔𝑠), and the cost of purchasing energy 
from the main grid (𝐺𝐵𝐶𝑆). 𝐴𝐶𝑔𝑆 is estimated as follows: 
            𝐴𝐶𝑔𝑠 = 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑠 + 𝐴𝑂𝑀𝑔𝑠 + 𝐴𝑅𝐶𝑔𝑠 + 𝑇𝐵𝑆𝑔𝑠 + 𝐺𝐵𝐶𝑆                                       (4.14) 
where 
- the annual capital cost is calculated as follows [88]: 
                                𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑠 =   (𝐶𝑐𝑎𝑝,)𝐶𝑅𝐹(𝑖, 𝑦)                                                            (4.15) 
in which                                                                                                                                           
  𝐶𝑐𝑎𝑝 represents the capital cost (US $), 𝐶𝑅𝐹  denotes the capital recovery factor, 𝑖 is annual 
real interest rate (12% interest rate is applied in this work), and 𝑦 is the project lifetime in a 
year. The 𝐶𝑅𝐹 is calculated as follows [111]  
                                               𝐶𝑅𝐹 = 𝑖
(1+𝑖)𝑦
(1+𝑖)𝑦−1
                                                                  (4.16) 
- The annual operation and maintenance cost (𝐴𝑂𝑀𝑔𝑠) of the MG is a function of the 
capital cost 𝐶𝑐𝑎𝑝 component reliability(𝜆), and project lifetime. This is calculated as 
follows [88]. 
                                   𝐴𝑂𝑀𝑔𝑠 = 𝐶𝑐𝑎𝑝
1−𝜆
𝑦
                                                                    (4.17) 
- The annual replacement cost (𝐴𝑅𝐶𝑔𝑠) is the cost of the replacement of a certain 
equipment during the project lifetime. In grid-connected mode the equipment that needs 
replacement is battery unit. This is calculated as follows [112]. 
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                                  𝐴𝑅𝐶𝑔𝑠 = (𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑝)𝑆𝐹𝐹(𝑖, 𝑦𝑟𝑒𝑝)                                                    (4.18) 
where  
 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑝  represents the replacement cost of battery units in US $,  𝑦𝑟𝑒𝑝 is the battery lifetime.  In 
this work, the replacement cost is the same as battery capital cost. 𝑆𝐹𝐹 represents the sinking 
fund factor, a ratio that is used to determine the future value of a series of equal cash flows. 
This is given as follows [112]. 
                               𝑆𝐹𝐹 =
𝑖
(1+𝑖)𝑦𝑟𝑒𝑝−1
                                                            (4.19) 
It is common to confuse when first determining the battery storage system costs. Some of the 
major contributions to the battery costs are the chemical materials that make up the battery, the 
life cycle of battery, the storage capacity, and the usable capacity. These factors can determine 
the costs of battery. With the regards to this research work, the annual cost of battery 
replacement is determined from (4.18).  
- The transfer micro-grid buying cost (𝑇𝐵𝑆𝑔𝑠) represents the cost of buying electricity 
among the participants of MG. This is determined in [3]  as follows: 
                               𝑇𝐵𝑆𝑔𝑠 =  ∑ 𝑊𝑝 𝑇𝑡𝐸𝑠′𝑠𝑦𝑡𝑝𝑠′𝑠                                                          (4.20) 
where  
 𝐸𝑠′𝑠  is the price of electricity transferred from site s’ to site s and 𝑦𝑡𝑝𝑠′𝑠is the quantity of 
electricity transferred on a day p at time t from site s’ to site s. 
- The main grid buying cost (GBC) is calculated in [3]as follows: 
                             𝐺𝐵𝐶𝑆 = ∑ 𝐶
𝑖
𝑡,𝑝 𝑊𝑝𝑇𝑡𝐼𝑡𝑝𝑠                                                             (4.21) 
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where  𝐶𝑖 is the price of electricity exported to the main grid, 𝐼𝑡𝑝𝑠  and is the quantity of 
electricity imported from the main grid. 𝑊𝑝 and 𝑇𝑡are defined as before.  
The profit (𝑃𝑟𝑔𝑠) of the grid-connected MG is expressed as 
                                       𝑃𝑟𝑔 = 𝐼𝑔𝑠 − 𝐴𝐶𝑔𝑠                                                                         (4.22) 
The function (𝐹𝑥𝑔) is the surplus which is also referred to as profit can be calculate as follows: 
                           𝐹𝑥𝑔 = ∏ (𝑃𝑟𝑔𝑠 − 𝑃𝑟𝑔𝑠
𝐿 )𝛼𝑠6𝑠=1                                                                      (4.23) 
where 
𝑃𝑟𝑔𝑠
𝐿  is the lower bound profit (otherwise called status-quo profit) of the participants for site 
𝑠 in grid-connected mode and 𝛼𝑠 is the participant negotiation powers. Since there are 6 sites, 
then S= 1,...6  
The objective function of the system in grid-connected mode is to maximize the profit i.e. 
        Max{𝐹𝑥𝑔}                                                                                                                 (4.24) 
B     Economic Model in Islanded mode 
 (a)    Annual income of the system in islanded mode 
The annual income (𝐼𝑑𝑠)of the participants in islanded mode of operation of MG is as follows: 
                                   𝐼𝑑𝑠 =  𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑑𝑠                                                                              (4.25) 
where 
  𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑑𝑠  is the transfer micro-grid selling cost in islanded mode. 
In this case, the same calculation holds as in (4.13) i.e.  𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑑𝑠 =  𝑇𝑆𝐶𝑔𝑠 
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(b)    Annual cost of the system in islanded mode. The term annual cost (𝐴𝐶𝑑𝑠) of the MG 
includes the annual capital cost (𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑠), annual operation and maintenance cost (𝐴𝑂𝑀𝑑𝑠), 
annual replacement cost (𝐴𝑅𝐶𝑑𝑠), annual fuel cost of DG (𝐴𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑠), the MG buying cost 
(𝑇𝐵𝐶𝑑𝑠). 
𝐴𝐶𝑑𝑆 is estimated as follows: 
                    𝐴𝐶𝑑𝑠 = 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑠 + 𝐴𝑂𝑀𝑑𝑠 + 𝐴𝑅𝐶𝑑𝑠 + 𝐴𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑠 + 𝑇𝐵𝐶𝑑𝑆                                  (4.26) 
- The annual capital cost, annual operation and maintenance cost of solar PV and diesel 
generator are calculated as in (4.15) and (4.17).  
- In addition, annual replacement cost of battery and transfer micro-grid buying cost are 
calculation as in (4.18), (4.19), and (4.20) respectively. 
-   The annual fuel cost (AFCds) is related with the generated power and the rated power.  
In this case, diesel should be operated at a rated power. Annual diesel generator cost is 
the same as annual fuel cost and is calculated as follows: 
                              𝐴𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑠 = 𝐶𝑓 ∑ 𝐹(𝑡)
8760
𝑖=1                                                                        (4.27) 
where 𝐶𝑓 is the fuel cost per litre. 
 𝐹(𝑡) is the hourly consumption of diesel generator. This is expressed as follows [113]:  
                        𝐹(𝑡) = 0.246𝑃𝐷𝐺(𝑡)+0.08415𝑃𝑅                                                          (4.28) 
where  𝑃𝐷𝐺  is the diesel generator actual power output in kW and 𝑃𝑅 is the rated (nominal) 
power of the generator. 
The profit (𝑃𝑟𝑑𝑠) of MG in islanded mode is expressed as 
                                    𝑃𝑟𝑑𝑠 = 𝐼𝑑𝑠 − 𝐴𝐶𝑑𝑠                                                                         (4.29) 
where   𝐼𝑑𝑠  and 𝐴𝐶𝑑𝑠 are defined as in (4.25) and (4.26)                             
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Table 4.1: Economic Data for energy management in both grid-connected and islanded modes, 
[3], [19]. [88].  
S/N Item Description Value 
1 Project lifetime (years) 20 
2 Interest rate (%) 3 
3 Inflation rate (%) 1.6 
4 Inverter lifetime  (years) 20 
5 PV panel lifetime (years) 20 
6 Reliability of Inverter (%) 98 
7 Reliability of PV panel (%) 98 
8 Reliability of diesel generator (%) 90 
9 Cost of diesel generator (US $/kW) 500 
10 Cost of PV panel (US $/W) 1830 
11 Cost of Inverter  (US $/kW) 138 
12 Fuel cost (𝐶𝑓) (US $/l) 0.55 
13 Cost of the battery (US $/l) 200 
14 Reliability of battery (%) 98 
 
The function (𝐹𝑥𝑑) is the surplus which is also referred to as profit and can be calculated as 
follows: 
                           𝐹𝑥𝑑 = ∏ (𝑃𝑟𝑑𝑠 − 𝑃𝑟𝑑𝑠
𝐿 )𝛼𝑠6𝑠=1                                                                    (4.30) 
where 𝑃𝑟𝑑𝑠
𝐿  is the lower bound profit (otherwise called status-quo profit) of the participants for 
site 𝑠 in islanded mode. 
The objective function of the system in islanded mode of MG is given as:  
        Max{𝐹𝑥𝑑}                                                                                                                  (4.31)     
4.2.2 Constraints 
A      Constraints in grid connected mode 
a.   Electricity demand constraints: 
At a certain time interval, electricity demand is equal to the output of solar PV, battery, quantity 
of electricity transferred from other locations/sites and imported electricity from the main grid 
minus quantity of electricity transferred to other sites and electricity exported to the main grid. 
65 
 
                ∑ 𝑦𝑡𝑝𝑠′𝑠𝑠′ − ∑ 𝑦𝑡𝑝𝑠𝑠′𝑠′ +𝐼𝑡𝑗𝑠−𝐸𝑡𝑝𝑠 + 𝑃𝐵𝑆(𝑡) + 𝑃𝑝𝑣𝑠(𝑡) = 𝐿𝑡𝑝𝑔𝑠                   (4.32) 
where    𝑦𝑡𝑝𝑠′𝑠 is the electricity transferred from other sites, 𝑦𝑡𝑝𝑠𝑠′  is the electricity transferred 
to other sites, 𝐼𝑡𝑝𝑠 is the electricity imported from the grid, 𝐸𝑡𝑝𝑠 is the electricity exported to 
the grid, 𝑃𝐵𝑆(𝑡)is the battery energy at time t and  𝑃𝑝𝑣𝑠(𝑡) is the solar PV power at time t. 
b.   Transfer price level 
Generally, in MG, electricity transfer price cost is non-linear. In this work, we applied the 
following formulation to convert it to a linear equivalent. The assumption is that the electricity 
transferred between locations have transfer price levels that are discrete in nature i.e. k discrete. 
Therefore, price 𝐸𝑠𝑠′ between two locations is expressed by the product of the decision variable 
𝑋𝑠𝑠′𝑘 and the parameter 𝐸𝑠𝑠′𝑘 and summed it over all the transfer price levels. 
                                          𝐸𝑠𝑠′ = ∑ 𝐸𝑠𝑠′𝑘𝑘 𝑋𝑠𝑠′𝑘           ∀𝑠, 𝑠′                                       (4.33) 
One transfer price level at most must be chosen at a time i.e. at certain particular time, only one 
transfer price can be used for all the participant sites. 
                                    ∑ 𝑋𝑠𝑠′𝑘𝑘  ≤ 1                          ∀𝑠, 𝑠′                                              (4.34) 
For each pair of site and between two transfer directions, electricity transfer prices are the same. 
                                 𝑋𝑠𝑠′𝑘 = 𝑋𝑠′𝑠𝑘                         ∀𝑠, 𝑠′                                                  (4.35) 
c.   Electricity transfer amount 
The total amount of the electricity transferred 𝑦𝑡𝑝𝑠𝑠′ is equal to the sum of the amounts that is 
transferred at each transfer price level k i.e. transfer price levels such as (0.039, 0.049…0.109) 
$/kWh as shown in Tables 5.13 to 5.18 
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                                    𝑦𝑡𝑝𝑠𝑠′ = ∑ 𝑌𝑡𝑝𝑠𝑠′𝑘𝑘              ∀𝑡, 𝑝, 𝑠, 𝑠
′                                          (4.36) 
                                    𝑌𝑡𝑝𝑠𝑠′𝑘 = 𝑦𝑡𝑝𝑠𝑠′ 𝑋𝑠𝑠′𝑘            ∀𝑡, 𝑝, 𝑠, 𝑠
′, 𝑘                                    (4.37) 
The upper bound of the electricity to be transferred from one site to another has been 
introduced, so that the linear transfer amount at k transfer price level given by 𝑌𝑡𝑝𝑠𝑠′𝑘  cannot 
exceed 𝑌𝑠𝑠
𝑢  which is the upper bound of electricity transferred from site 𝑠 to site 𝑠′. The 
electricity cannot be transferred if the transfer price level k is not selected, so that 𝑌𝑡𝑝𝑠𝑠′𝑘 = 0 
                   𝑌𝑡𝑝𝑠𝑠′𝑘 ≤ 𝑌𝑠𝑠′
𝑢  . 𝑋𝑠𝑠′𝑘                        ∀𝑡, 𝑝, 𝑠, 𝑠
′, 𝑘                                            (4.38) 
The demand of the participants must first be met before selling electricity to other sites. In the 
same vein, it is forbidden to purchase electricity from one site and at the same time while selling 
to the main grid. To overcome this problem, we introduced the binary variable 𝑋𝑡𝑝𝑠
𝑚  to satisfy 
the above two conditions by using the constraints as indicated below, where 𝑌𝑠
𝑢 represents the 
upper bound of electricity transferred to the site s. 
𝑋𝑡𝑝𝑠
𝑚 =  {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑑 𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠
0       𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                                                                                                
 
                                ∑ 𝑦𝑡𝑝𝑠′𝑠𝑠′ + 𝐼𝑡𝑝𝑠 ≤ 𝑌𝑠
𝑢𝑋𝑡𝑝𝑠
𝑚               ∀𝑡, 𝑝, 𝑠                                     (4.39) 
                             ∑ 𝑦𝑡𝑝𝑠𝑠′𝑠′ + 𝐸𝑡𝑝𝑠 ≤ 𝑌𝑠
𝑢(1 − 𝑋𝑡𝑝𝑠
𝑚 )      ∀𝑡, 𝑝, 𝑠                                  (4.40) 
The expression 𝐸𝑠𝑠′𝑦𝑡𝑝𝑠𝑠′ in transferred electricity selling cost 𝑇𝑆𝐶 is formulated as 
∑ 𝐸𝑠𝑠′𝑘𝑘 𝑌𝑡𝑝𝑠𝑠′𝑘 which is considered as linear. 
d.    Power balance constraint 
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The power balance indicates the amount of power to be supplied/ absorbed in the system so 
that balance of power is achieved in grid-connected mode. The power balance equation gives 
the relationship between the power generated and power demanded at a certain time. 
                        𝑃𝐿𝑔𝑠(𝑡) = 𝑃𝑝𝑣𝑠(𝑡) + 𝑃𝐵𝑠(𝑡) + 𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑠(t)                                                    (4.41) 
where  𝑃𝐿𝑔𝑠(𝑡) is the load power in grid connected mode at time t, 𝑃𝑝𝑣𝑠(𝑡) is the PV system 
power at time t, 𝑃𝐵𝑠(𝑡)  is the battery power and 𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑠(t) denotes the grid power at time t for 
site s. 
e.   Grid power limits constraint  
The main grid power exchange is limited as follows: 
                         𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑑
𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤  𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑠(t) ≤ 𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑑
𝑚𝑎𝑥                                                                (4.42) 
where 𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑑
𝑚𝑖𝑛  is the minimum grid power, 𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑑
𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the maximum grid power 
f. Battery power output.  
The battery power is limited as follows: 
                  𝑃𝐵𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑡) ≤ 𝑃𝐵𝑠(𝑡) ≤ 𝑃𝐵𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑡)                                                            (4.43) 
𝑃𝐵𝑠(𝑡) < 0: Battery is charging  
𝑃𝐵𝑠(𝑡) > 0: Battery is discharging to serve the load 
𝑃𝐵𝑠(𝑡) = 0 : Battery is at rest 
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e.   Battery energy state of charge constraint. 
                             𝑆𝑂𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝑆𝑂𝑆𝑆 ≤ 𝑆𝑂𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥                                                      (4.44) 
B      Constraints in Islanded mode 
a.   Electricity demand constraints: 
At each time interval, electricity demand is equal to the output of diesel generator, solar PV, 
battery, and the amount of electricity transferred from other locations/sites. 
               ∑ 𝑦𝑡𝑝𝑠′𝑠𝑠′ − ∑ 𝑦𝑡𝑝𝑠𝑠′𝑠′ + 𝑃𝐵𝑠(𝑡) + 𝑃𝑝𝑣𝑠(𝑡) +  𝑃𝐷𝐺𝑠 = 𝐿𝑡𝑝𝑠                             (4.45) 
where 𝑦𝑡𝑝𝑠′𝑠 is the electricity transferred from other locations, 𝑦𝑡𝑝𝑠𝑠′  is the electricity 
transferred to other locations, 𝑃𝐷𝐺𝑠(𝑡)is the energy from diesel generator, 𝑃𝐵𝑠(𝑡) is the Battery 
energy at time t and  𝑃𝑝𝑣𝑠(𝑡) is the solar PV power at time t. 
b.   Transfer price level and electricity transfer amount: 
This is the same as transfer price and amount of electricity in grid-connected mode, given in 
(4.34) – (4.36) and (4.37) – (4.41). 
c.    Power balance constraint 
The power balance indicates the amount of power to be supplied/ absorbed in the system so 
that balance of power is achieved in islanded mode. In this work, the solar PV, battery, and the 
diesel generator are used. The power balance equation gives the relationship between the power 
generated and power demanded at a certain time. 
                          𝑃𝐿𝑑𝑠(𝑡) = 𝑃𝑝𝑣𝑠(𝑡) + 𝑃𝐵𝑠(𝑡) + 𝑃𝐷𝐺𝑠(t)                                                   (4.46) 
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where  𝑃𝐿𝑑𝑠(𝑡) is the load power in grid connected mode at time t, 𝑃𝑝𝑣𝑠(𝑡) is the PV system 
power at time t, 𝑃𝐵𝑠(𝑡)  is the battery power and 𝑃𝐷𝐺𝑠(t) denotes the generator power at time t 
for site s.                                                                                            . 
d.    Battery power and the battery state of charge:  
This is the same as the battery power and battery state of charge in grid connected mode given 
in (4.44) and (4.45). 
4.3   Fair Allocation of Utility 
Game theory has been used to find a solution that is ‘fairness’. The word ‘fairness’ can be 
measured in different ways. In [73], fairness is defined as the process of judgement used to 
arrive at an acceptable, reasonable or just of an outcome. Maxwell [114] and Huppert, et al. 
[115] reported that the perceived unfairness can decrease the utility, which may discourage 
willingness of customers to purchase a certain commodity. There are many ways by which 
fairness can be influenced to eliminate offers that are unfair from purchase options. With 
fairness, utility of an offer can be reduced through necessary adjustments that result in fairness. 
In addition, a decision rule, which is applied to the purchase, can be changed with the use of 
fairness. Lastly, increase in choice variability can be manifested by the use of fairness. 
In this section, the common criteria used for fair sharing utility are discussed. The criterion can 
be obtained in both the weighted form and a simple form. The weighted form has been 
introduced because of the need to provide for more utility for the player with higher bargaining 
power. The simple form has to do with a situation when utility is linear, which is Nash 
bargaining solution that is discussed in the next section. 
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4.3.1     Nash Criterion 
Cooperative game theory uses the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) to obtain a fair resource 
allocation [62]. The approach must be able to satisfy certain axioms to obtain a fair utility 
distribution. These axioms deal with the resources associated with the players of the game, 
which is the main goal of this method when compared with the fairness previously described. 
In utility distribution, the NBS has been used for fair cost distribution [3]. In this case, the 
utility function is linear. In reality, the utility function could be non-linear i.e. concave function. 
Let us consider 𝑁 players and profit function 𝐽. The allocation of profit using NBS proceeds in 
these steps as adapted in [116]: 
(1) There is cooperation amongst the players to maximize their profits 
(2) The status-quo profit (which is regarded as disagreement point) is calculated as 
𝐷 = (𝐷1, 𝐷2, … , 𝐷𝑛) where the status-quo profit 𝐷𝑖 is the minimum profit, which is ready to be 
received by 𝑖𝑡ℎ players 
Note that the bargaining is successful when the normal profit exceeds the status-quo profit.                                                                                                                       
On the other hand, the profit of each player must be greater than the status-quo profit 
                               𝜖 =  𝐽𝑖−𝐷𝑖 ≥ 0                                                                           (4.47) 
where  𝜖 represents the cooperation discount and the players in this case, have identical discount 
of cooperation. Lastly, by adapting [116] and [117], the profit J is the maximum profit that is 
allocated to player 𝑖 when given 𝐽 and 𝐷 in step 2, which results in a fair profit allocation to 
the players. In the next section, we present fairness scheme, which is the main contribution of 
the thesis. 
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4.3.2   Proposed Fairness Scheme 
We have presented a linear utility function in which the NBS is suitable for solving profit 
allocation bargaining game. In reality, the utility function may be non-linear i.e. concave 
function. 
Cooperative game theory may be defined in terms of fairness criteria [64] . This work 
concentrates on the generalised Nash bargaining solution and this is formulated from the 
generalised function of proportional fairness. Because utility function is concave, the NBS, 
which is expressed in the following theorem, is used to solve profit allocation to the participants 
of MG. 
Theorem 1: (NBS) [81] Let consider a function 𝐺𝑠 defined as 𝐺𝑠: (𝐽𝑆, 𝑑𝑠)  ⟶ ℛ
𝑁 , the concept 
of the NBS can be considered as a bargaining solution that is unique having  𝐽𝑠
∗ = 𝐺𝑠(𝐽𝑠, 𝑑𝑠) 
to the resource allocation bargaining game provided necessary axioms are satisfied and can be 
described as 
                         𝐽𝑠
∗ =  ∏ (𝐽𝑖,𝑠
𝑁
𝑖=1 − 𝑑𝑖,𝑠)                                                                           (4.48) 
The necessary axioms for the NBS are given below. 
(1) Individual rationality: 𝐽𝑖,𝑠
∗ ≥ 𝑑𝑖,𝑠) for all players  𝑖, 𝑠. 
(2) Feasibility: 𝐽𝑖,𝑠
∗  𝜖𝐽𝑠. 
(3) Pareto optimality: 𝐽𝑠
∗ is Pareto optimal. 
(4) Independence of irrelevant alternatives.  
(5)  Independence of Linear Transformations. 
(6) Symmetry 
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From these axioms, the efficiency and existence of the NBS is guaranteed by axioms 1-3. 
Solution fairness satisfied axioms 4-6. The axiom of symmetry guarantees equal utility of the 
players [81], [118]. In this case, the same bargaining power is assigned to each player if the 
symmetric axiom is satisfied. If the players are different structurally it may not be reasonable 
to use equal utility distribution for them. 
In [118], [81], the generalized NBS is used as a variant to relax the axiom of symmetry by 
assigning different bargaining power to the players. In this case, (4.48) is modified as 
                           𝐽𝑠
∗ = arg 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∏ (𝐽𝑖,𝑠
𝑁
𝑖=1 − 𝑑𝑖,𝑠)
𝛼,𝛽,𝛾                                                   (4.49) 
where 
 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾 are the corresponding bargaining power of the three players  
If 𝛼 = 𝛽 =  𝛾 = 1 then the criterion proposed coincides with the NBS. The approach is more 
of the utility functions by quadratic parameterized functions. 
4.4 Proposed Algorithm for Solving Energy Management in 
Micro-grid 
4.4.1   Teaching-Learning-based Optimization (TLBO) 
Through the constrained and unconstrained benchmark functions, the TLBO algorithm had 
been tested  and proved to be better than other advanced optimization techniques like PSO, 
differential evolution (DE), GA, artificial bee colony (ABC), etc. [119] . It also proved better 
in other fields of engineering such as those reported by Krishanand et al. [120], Togan [121] in 
civil engineering, Satapathy et al [122] in the field of electrical engineering etc. Rao and Patel 
[119] had justified that the TLBO algorithm is an algorithm specific parameter-less algorithm, 
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which requires only common control parameter, such as population size, number of iteration 
and elite size.  
 In [123], the linear programming model has been applied for high-level system design, and 
unit commitment of DERs to minimize the cost of the micro-grid. In [124], the economic 
benefit of MG is estimated and high efficiency as well as cost saving are achieved. Agrawal, 
et al. in [125], proposed a new algorithm, TLBO for the management of congestion in a pool 
based electricity market. The algorithm is validated on the IEEE 30- and IEEE 5- bus systems 
and the results obtained are compared with the PSO and random search method. The results 
showed that the rescheduling cost and losses are much lower than other approaches. The results 
achieved have proven the efficiency of this method. In [126], the TLBO is proposed to optimize 
mechanical design problems. The robustness and good performance of the algorithm is 
validated on five different constraint benchmark test functions. The algorithm is compared with 
other heuristic algorithms (i.e. PSO, ABC, PSO-DE, etc.), which showed that TLBO algorithm 
is more robust, effective and efficient when compared to other optimization methods under 
investigation. In [127], TLBO is proposed to solve a combined heat and power dispatch with 
bounded feasible operating region. The results of TLBO are compared with other heuristics 
algorithms like PSO, real coded GA, DE, and bee colony optimization (BCO). It was 
demonstrated that the TLBO is able to reach optimal solution with faster convergence. 
The heuristic approaches discussed above have specific-parameters that must be tuned properly 
as lack of proper tuning results in the local optimal solution. To deal with the drawbacks [126], 
[128], [129] proposed the teaching-learning-based-optimization (TLBO) algorithm in which 
no algorithm-specific parameters are used. It only needs the common controlling parameters 
(e.g. population size and the number of generations) for its operation. TLBO algorithms is robust, 
effective and good potential with reduced optimization parameters for solving complex and multi-
objective functions. The TLBO algorithm is an inspired method based on the process of teaching 
74 
 
and learning, i.e., the effect a teacher has on the learner’s output in a classroom. The method 
considers two learning processes; the teacher phase and the learner phase. The method 
considers the population as a learner’s group and the different types of subject taught to the 
learners correspond to the design parameters of the problem. In addition, the learner’s result is 
the fitness value of the TLBO problem. The teacher is taken to be the best solution in the 
algorithm and the parameters involved in the given problem actually represent the design 
variables in the objective function. The best value in the objective function depicts the best 
solution of the algorithm. The TLBO algorithm requires not only the population size but also 
the number of iteration and no specific control parameters are involved. 
TLBO algorithms have been involved in optimization problems. In [103], TLBO performance 
was validated when compared with some popular optimization methods such as generalized 
differential evolution (GDA), the dynamic multi-objective evolutionary algorithm 
(DMOEADD) and the archive-based micro-genetic algorithm (AMGO). With the benchmark 
of the multi-objective functions, the results reveal that TLBO has performed better than other 
optimization methods. In [97], the authors considered the TLBO to solve optimization 
problems involving non-linear system. The algorithm is tested using different benchmark 
models. When the results are compare with other inspired optimization methods, the TLBO 
showed the best performance. It also requires less computational effort with better 
performance. 
In [130], the authors present TLBO to obtain the optimal sizing and the best position for the 
thyristor controlled series capacitor (TCSC) in a certain power system. The results obtained 
when compared with other heuristic methods such as ABC and PSO showed that the line losses 
due to the bus voltages, active and reactive power are improved. This shows that TLBO gives 
better results than PSO and ABC.  Agrawal, et al. in [131], propose the use of TLBO algorithms 
for congestion management. The algorithm having tested on the bus systems (i.e. IEEE bus 
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systems) the results obtained are compared with the PSO and random search method. The 
results showed that the rescheduling cost and losses are much lower with TLBO than other 
algorithms. 
TLBO algorithm is robust, effective and good potential with reduced optimization parameters 
for solving complex and multi-objective functions. 
4.4.2    Application of TLBO in Energy Management of Micro-grid 
A. Teaching-Learning-based Optimization Algorithm 
In this thesis, teaching-learning-based optimization (TLBO) algorithm is presented to 
efficiently optimize Nash objective function. The algorithm is population-based and thus, the 
optimal solution is obtained using the population of a solution. The TLBO algorithm is an 
inspired method that depends on the teaching-learning process, i.e. the effect a teacher has on 
the learner’s output in a classroom. There are two learning processes: the teacher and the learner 
phases. The teacher is selected to be the start of the algorithm, which is considered the most 
intelligent student in the class. The entire population needs to be updated in order to obtain a 
better teacher. After obtaining the teacher, a new teacher is used to update the population and 
the iteration continues. In addition, the number of the iteration can be reduced by using a larger 
population size to obtain the optimal solution. 
(a) Teacher Phase: A teacher is first selected in the algorithm and this is done to achieve the 
maximum value of the objective function by taking into consideration the member of the 
population. After teacher selection, the mean, teacher value, and a random variable are the 
parameters used to update the population value of each subject. To apply this to our problem 
of maximization of profit, the population is set to 60. 
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(b) Learner Phase:  In learner phase, there is interaction amongst the learners to increase their 
knowledge. The procedure is that one learner is selected randomly and will be used to compare 
with other learners in order to update the learner. If the learner selected has a higher objective 
function, the result will be added to a random number multiplied by selecting minus random 
member. If the objective function of the learner selected does have a higher objective function, 
there will be addition to a random number multiplied by the random minus selected member. 
The first iteration using TLBO is completed. 
B.  Application of TLBO Algorithm for the Energy Management 
In this work, a TLBO algorithm is proposed for profit maximization of the MG participants. 
The algorithm has a population size of 60, the number of generation is 300 as applied in the 
previous algorithms (i.e. GA and PSO) and the rationale behind choosing these parameters is 
justified in the simulation results. The problem at hand to be solved contains six variables to 
be optimized.   
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Figure 4.4: Flowchart for Teacher and Learner Phases   
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When using TLBO algorithm in optimizing the solution, the procedure is to execute the 
program by first run it and obtain the results. The next step is to select a teacher, which results 
in the highest outcome. This is followed by updating each variable using concept of teaching 
phase, the best solution 𝑌𝑛𝑒𝑤 is calculated with the teacher 𝑌𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 for each of the 300 
iterations as indicated in Figure 4.4 
Let the teacher 𝑇𝑖 with mean 𝑀𝑖 and at any iteration 𝑖, teacher 𝑇𝑖 will then try to move towards 
its own level thereby making new mean to be 𝑇𝑖 represented by 𝑀𝑛𝑒𝑤. The solution is updated 
in accordance with the difference between the old and the new mean given by 
           𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓. 𝑚 = 𝑟𝑖(𝑀𝑛𝑒𝑤 − 𝑇𝑓𝑀𝑖)                                                         (4.50) 
where 𝑟𝑖 is a random number between 0 and 1, 𝑇𝑓 is a teaching factor which can be either I or 
2. The existing solution is modified  according to the following expression 
                      𝑌𝑛𝑒𝑤,𝑖 = 𝑌𝑜𝑙𝑑,𝑖 + 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓. 𝑚                                                       (4.51) 
The learner phase begins with the values obtained in teacher phase, and the learner is then 
compared to another learner that is randomly selected. The next step is to update the learner 
depends on which learner optimized better. Something new is learnt by a learner if the other 
learner is more knowledgeable than the other. The expression below gives learner modification 
𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1  
Select two learners 𝑌𝑖 and 𝑌𝑗 at random, where 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 
𝑌𝑛𝑒𝑤,𝑖 = 𝑌𝑜𝑙𝑑,𝑖 + 𝑟𝑖(𝑌𝑖−𝑌𝑗)  
Else 
𝑌𝑛𝑒𝑤,𝑖 = 𝑌𝑜𝑙𝑑,𝑖 + 𝑟𝑖(𝑌𝑗−𝑌𝑖)  
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End if 
End for 
Accept 𝑌𝑛𝑒𝑤,𝑖, if it gives a better function 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
 
Chapter 5 
Simulation, Results and Discussions 
The emergence of the micro-grids tends to reduce the emission and utility demand burden 
because MGs use renewable energy as DERs to serve local communities. The selection of 
various types of DERs, modelling and operation plan are the key factors that determine the 
deployment of a successful micro-grid. Micro-grids are regarded as a collaborative network 
and formation of a coalition can be beneficial to all the participants as a group rather than being 
independent from one another with pure self-interest. Therefore, a cooperation will allow the 
participants of micro-grid to benefit for the improve design and operation. Many researchers 
in power system have developed a number of models in the energy management for the cost 
optimization but the model in which the participants cooperate with the bargaining powers, is 
usually not considered. In this chapter, the results of the simulation are presented.  
5.1      Case Study 
The simulation studies are carried out on a case study of a micro-grid with six sites: a school, 
a hotel, a restaurant, a fire station, a residential building, and a hospital. The case study is 
developed to test the propose approach. Figure 5.1 shows the output power of solar PV. The 
data of solar PV, generators and batteries are extracted from [88], [132]. The installed 
distributed generations are shown in Table 5.1. The installed distributed generation for each 
participant site is assumed the same despite variations in the load demand and solar PV power. 
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This is because other participants will efficiently use the excess power generated from the 
participants’ DERs with low power consumption due to cooperation and coordination that exist 
amongst them.   
 The simulations are carried out on an HP with Intel(𝑅) Pentium (𝑅) CPU 2020M @ 2.40GHZ 
with a RAM size of 4GB. In the MG, global profit distribution using cooperative game theory 
in both the grid-connected and islanded mode is compared with a situation when the game 
theory is not applied. 
A transfer price of 0.039$/kWh, the price of electricity import from the utility grid is $0.17, 
and the cost of electricity export to the utility grid $0.0131 are considered [3]. Rated power of 
diesel generator is given as 10kVA for each participant. Under a given fixed electricity selling 
and buying prices the status-quo profits (lower bounds profits) are determined by the main grid 
scenario costs (when it is connected to the main grid) and micro-grid scenario costs (when 
operates in islanded mode).  
 
Figure 5.1: Solar Power for each site (a) Summer (b) Winter [88] 
In the fair profit, each participant obtained maximum profit. The unfair profit distribution is 
obtained in which some participants obtained the profit lower than the status-quo profit. 
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Finally, a fair weighted profit distribution is obtained by assigning negotiation power indicators 
to all the participants using game theory based on generalized Nash bargaining solution. 
Table 5.1: Installed Distributed Generation in each Site 
Unit Type Min Power (kW) Max. Power (kW) 
Solar PV 0 20 
Diesel Generator 3 10 
Battery -10 10 
 
5.2   Energy Demand and Generation Scheduling for the Participants 
of Micro-grid. 
5.2.1     Energy Demand Profiles 
In this study, we consider the energy demand profiles having a total number of 14 different 
periods per day for two representative days per year (197 winter days, and 168 summer days) 
as shown in Table 5.2 [3]. The weighting factor 𝑊𝑃 depicts the weight of the day for each of 
the seasons.  
Table 5.2: Duration for energy demand profile [3] 
Period Duration  (hr) Hours in the day 
𝑇1  6 1.00am-7.am 
𝑇2  2 7.00am-9.00am 
𝑇3  3 9.00am-12.00pm 
𝑇4  1 1200pm-1.00pm 
𝑇5 5 1.00pm-6.00pm 
𝑇6 4 6.00pm-10.00pm 
𝑇7 3 10.00pm-1.00am 
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The participants of the MG are as follows: school, fire station, hotel, hospital, restaurant and 
residential building. All the buildings are built to passive-Haus standard according to the 
information provided by the developer of [3]. The electricity demand profiles for each 
participant for both the winter and summer days are shown in Table 5.3.  
Table 5.3: Electricity demand for both winter and summer seasons (Day 1 for winter and Day 
2 for summer) [3]. 
Day Time 
(hr) 
School 
(kW) 
Hotel 
(kW) 
Restaurant 
(kW) 
Fire 
Station 
(kW) 
Residential 
Building 
(kW) 
Hospital 
(kW) 
Day 1 𝑇1  2.1 2.3 8.9 2.1 3.7 3.0 
Day 1 𝑇2  2.1 9.3 3.5 3.3 5.6 4.5 
Day 1 𝑇3  10.7 11.6 8.9 6.8 7.5 7.3 
Day 1 𝑇4  10.7 11.6 17.7 6.8 7.5 7.3 
Day 1 𝑇5  10.7 11.6 8.9 6.8 7.5 7.3 
Day 1 𝑇6  4.3 9.3 17.7 4.1 18.6 5.4 
Day 1 𝑇7  2.1 2.3 8.9 2.1 3.7 3.0 
Day 2 𝑇1  2.1 2.3 8.9 2.1 3.7 3.0 
Day 2 𝑇2 2.1 9.3 3.5 3.3 5.6 4.5 
Day 2 𝑇3  10.7 11.6 8.9 6.8 7.5 7.3 
Day 2 𝑇4  10.7 11.6 17.7 6.8 7.5 7.3 
Day 2 𝑇5  10.7 11.6 8.9 6.8 7.5 7.3 
Day 2 𝑇6  4.3 9.3 17.7 4.1 18.6 5.4 
Day 2 𝑇7   2.1 2.3 8.9 2.1 3.7 3.0 
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For each period, the energy profiles provide the constant energy demand [3], [133]. The school, 
fire station and hospital have energy consumption hours majorly during the daytime; the 
restaurant has its peak demand of electricity during lunchtime and dinnertime. Moreover, the 
peak electricity demand for residential building is in the morning when people are preparing to 
go to work and in the evening time when workers return home from work and the hotel has 
peak energy demand during the working hours. These different energy demand patterns bring 
about the possibility of the sites/locations to come together and benefit from MG.  
5.2.2 Energy Generation Scheduling for Micro-grid Participants 
Simulations are performed in both grid-connected and islanded modes to show the generation 
schedule of MG. 
A Grid-Connected Mode 
In this mode, simulations are carried out in the following cases: generation scheduling, import 
and export electricity and electricity transferred between the participants of MG. 
(a) Generation schedule and import and export electricity 
Table 5.4a presents the demand schedule on an hourly basis. Table 5.4b presents own 
generation and excess/deficit for each participant on an hourly basis. The restaurant has a high 
electricity demand in the morning and in the night than other participants. This site (restaurant) 
is even considered the highest energy demand among the sites. Generally, the profile of energy 
demand for all the participants indicates that the electricity demand occurs virtually every hour 
of the day because of their differences in energy demand patterns. 
The optimal generation schedule for the micro-grid (MG) in this mode of operation is shown 
in column 1 of Table 5.4b for each participant. From the table, it can be observed that during 
the periods 7a.m. to 5p.m. when there is solar radiation the battery operates in a high level state 
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of charge (SOC) and when fully charged it hibernates so that longer life of battery will be 
preserved. However, there is insufficient power to cope with the demand in certain periods. For 
example, during the periods 1a.m. to 6a.m and 6p.m. to 12midnight solar generation is 
unavailable and battery discharges power to supply the loads to each participant in the sites. 
The performance of battery during charging and discharging modes are shown in Figure 5.2. 
The optimal electricity exported and imported to/from the main grid is shown in the second to 
the last column and the last column respectively of Table 5.4b. The rule is that during the day 
when there is high solar radiation the participants must first satisfy their own demand and if 
surplus exists, satisfy another participant in other sites that may need power before selling 
energy to the grid. Hence, solar power radiation is present during the day and energy demands 
are met by solar PV of each site and/or by exchanging energy with other participants to meet 
the load demand and the surplus energy is sold to the main grid. The last column of Table 5.4b 
depicts the total hourly energy exported to the main grid. By plotting the values of export 
electricity in the last column of Table 5.4b with time, the curve obtained is shown in Figure 
5.3.  
During the night and early in the morning, there is no solar generation, the capacity of each 
battery in each site cannot cope with the load demand, and in this case, the energy is imported 
from the grid to meet the load demand. It can be seen from the load demand profile that the 
restaurant, residential building, and the hospital have relatively higher electricity demand in 
the night than other participants. The optimal energy imported from the main grid is shown in 
the second to the last column of Table 5.4b. It can be seen from the results obtained that 
between the periods of 1a.m. to 6a.m. and 7p.m. to 12 mid-night, the local generation is grossly 
inadequate to meet the load demand, thus, electricity is imported from the main grid. By 
plotting the values of import electricity in the second to the last column of Table 5.4b with 
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time, the curve obtained is shown in Figure 5.4. It is observed that electricity is imported in the 
morning and in the night when solar PV is not charging.. 
Table 5.4a: Hourly Electricity Demand Schedule. 
Hour School 
(kW) 
Hotel 
(kW) 
Restaurant 
(kW)  
Fire Station 
(kW) 
Residential Building 
(kW) 
Hospital 
(kW) 
1 2.1 2.3 8.9 2.1 3.7 3 
2 2.1 2.3 8.9 2.1 3.7 3 
3 2.1 2.3 8.9 2.1 3.7 3 
4 2.1 2.3 8.9 2.1 3.7 3 
5 2.1 2.3 8.9 2.1 3.7 3 
6 2.1 2.3 8.9 2.1 3.7 3 
7 2.1 9.3 3.5 3.3 5.6 4.5 
8 2.1 9.3 3.5 3.3 5.6 4.5 
9 10.7 11.6 8.9 6.8 7.5 7.3 
10 10.7 11.6 8.9 6.8 7.5 7.3 
11 10.7 11.6 8.9 6.8 7.5 7.3 
12 10.7 11.6 17.7 6.8 7.5 7.3 
13 10.7 11.6 8.9 6.8 7.5 7.3 
14 10.7 11.6 8.9 6.8 7.5 7.3 
15 10.7 11.6 8.9 6.8 7.5 7.3 
16 10.7 11.6 8.9 6.8 7.5 7.3 
17 10.7 11.6 8.9 6.8 7.5 7.3 
18 4.3 9.3 17.7 4.1 18.6 5.4 
19 4.3 9.3 17.7 4.1 18.6 5.4 
20 4.3 9.3 17.7 4.1 18.6 5.4 
21 4.3 9.3 17.7 4.1 18.6 5.4 
22 2.1 2.3 8.9 2.1 3.7 3 
23 2.1 2.3 8.9 2.1 3.7 3 
24 2.1 2.3 8.9 2.1 3.7 3 
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                                        Table 5.4b: Generation Schedule of the participants in grid-connected mode.  
Time 
(Hrs) 
School   (kW) Hotel  (kW) 
Restaurant  
(kW) 
Fire Station  
(kW) 
Residential Building 
(kW) Hospital  (kW) 
Import 
(kW) 
Export 
(kW) 
Own 
Gen 
E/D 
Own 
Gen 
E/D 
Own 
Gen 
E/D 
Own 
Gen 
E/D Own Gen E/D 
Own 
Gen 
E/D   
1  2.1   0  2.1  -0.2  2.1  -6.8  2  -0.1  2.1 -1.6   2  -1  9.7  0 
2  2.1   0  2.1  -0.2  2.1  -6.8  2  -0.1  2.1  -1.6  2  -1  9.7  0 
3  2.1   0  2.1  -0.2  2.1  -6.8  2  -0.1  2.1  -1.6  2  -1  9.7  0 
4  2.1   0  2.1  -0.2  2.1  -6.8  2  -0.1  2.1  -1.6  2  -1  9.7  0 
5  2.4  0.3  2.3  0  2.4  -6.5  2.3  0.2  2.2  -1.5  2.3  -0.7  8.2  0 
6  2.7 0.6  2.5  0.2  2.8  -6.1  2.6  0.5  2.8  -0.9  3.1  0.1  5.6  0 
7  5.5  3.4  5.3  -4  5.6  2.1  5.3  2  5.5  -0.1  5.4  0.9  0  4.3 
8  7.7  5.6  7.2  -2.1  7.8  4.3  6.5  3.2  7.3  1.7  6.3  1.8  0  14.5 
9  10.2  -0.5  9  -2.6  9.5  0.6  7.9  1.1  10.5  3  7.8  0.5  0  2.1 
10  11.7  1  10.9  -0.7  11.4  2.5  8.4  1.6  11.5  4  8.5  1.2  0  10.5 
11  12.8  2.1  12.1  0.5  12.6  3.7  9.5  2.7  12.6  5.1  9.6  2.3  0  16.4 
12  13  2.3  12.8  1.2  13.1  -4.6  10  3.2  13  5.5  10  2.7  0  10.3 
13  15  4.3  14.8  3.2  15  6.1  10  3.2  15  7.5  10  2.7  0  27 
14  14.8  4.1  14.8  3.2  15  6.1  9.8 3  14.6  7.1  9.7  2.4  0  25.9 
15  14.3  3.6  13.9  2.3  14.5  5.6  9.3  2.5  14.2  6.7  9.1  1.8  0  22.5 
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Time 
(Hrs) 
School   (kW) Hotel  (kW) 
Restaurant  
(kW) 
Fire Station  
(kW) 
Residential Building 
(kW) 
Hospital  (kW) 
Import 
(kW) 
Export 
(kW) 
Own 
Gen 
E/D 
Own 
Gen 
E/D 
Own 
Gen 
E/D 
Own 
Gen 
E/D Own Gen E/D 
Own 
Gen 
E/D 
  
16  12.9  2.2  12.4  0.8  13.1  4.2  8.5  1.7  12.8  5.3  8.7  1.4  0  15.6 
17  10.7  0  10.2  -1.4  10.8  1.9  7.1  0.3  10.6  3.1  7.2  -0.1  0  3.8 
18  7.7  3.4  7.7  -1.6  7.8  -9.9  5.6  1.5  7.5  0  5.7  -1.6  8.2  0 
19  5  0.7  4.8  -4.5  5.2  -12.5  3.6  -0.5  4.9  -13.7  3.4 - 2  32.5  0 
20  3.5  -0.8  3.2  -6.1  3.7  -14  2.9  -1.2  3.6  -15  3 - 2.4  39.5  0 
21  2.8  -1.5  2.5  -6.8  2.9  -14.8  2.2  -1.9  2.7  -15.9  2.3 - 3.1  44  0 
22  2.1  0  2.1  -0.2  2.1  -6.8  2  -0.1  2.1  -1.6  2  -1  9.7  0 
23  2.1  0  2.1  -0.2  2.1  -6.8  2  -0.1  2.1  -1.6  2  -1  9.7  0 
24  2.1  0  2.1  -0.2  2.1  -6.8  2  -0.1  2.1  -1.6  2  -1  9.7  0 
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where: Dem=demand, own gen. = own generation, E/D= excess/deficit. Negative sign under 
E/D column means deficit. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Power output of battery for each hour of the day. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Total Electricity Exported to the main grid 
 
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
P
o
w
er
 O
u
tp
u
t 
(k
W
)
Time (hrs)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
El
ec
tr
ic
it
y 
Ex
p
o
rt
ed
 t
o
 t
h
e 
G
ri
d
 (
kW
)
Time (hr)
90 
 
s 
Figure 5.4: Total Electricity Imported from the main grid 
(b) Electricity Transfer between Participants of MG in a Grid-connected mode 
Electricity can be transferred between the MG participants at an agreed price. In this case, 
electricity can be transferred at a fixed transfer price of 0.039kWh as adopted in [3]. Table 5.5 
gives the optimal energy transfer from one site to another site on an hourly basis. From 1am to 
4am and 8pm to 12mid-night, no electricity transfer is possible because there is no solar power 
at that time and battery is not sufficient to provide the surplus energy. However, there is a high 
electricity transfer between 7am to 10am, 12noon and 5pm to 6pm.The optimal amount of 
electricity transfer for a period of one year between the participants is shown in Table 5.6.  
The electricity transfer amongst the participants is made possible based on the differences in 
peak electricity demand profile for each participant. The participant with surplus energy during 
a particular time will transfer the excess to other participants in need of energy. For example, 
school transfer a total amount of 328.5 kW of electricity to the residential building in a year, 
whereas, in a year, the fire station transfer 720 kW of electricity to the residential building, and 
so on.  
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Table 5.5: Hourly Electricity Transfer between Sites in Grid-Connected Mode. 
Time 
(hr) 
Site Amount of Electricity Transferred (kW) 
 
From To 
 
1 Nil Nil 0 
2 Nil Nil 0 
3 Nil Nil 0 
4 Nil Nil  0 
5 School Residential Building 0.3 
Fire Station Residential Building 0.2 
6 School Residential Building 0.6 
Hospital Residential Building 0.1 
Fire Station Restaurant 0.5 
Hotel Residential Building 0.2 
7 School Hotel 3.4 
Restaurant Hotel 0.6 
8 School Hotel 2.1 
9 Residential Building Hotel 2.6 
Fire Station School 0.5 
10 Fire Station Hotel 0.7 
11 Nil Nil 0 
12 Residential Building Restaurant 4.6 
13 Nil Nil 0 
14 Nil Nil 0 
15 Nil Nil 0 
16 Nil Nil  0 
17 Restaurant Hotel 1.4 
18 School Restaurant 3.4 
Fire Station Restaurant 1.5 
19 School Hospital 0.7 
20 Nil Nil 0 
21 Nil Nil 0 
22 Nil Nil 0 
23 Nil Nil 0 
24 Nil Nil 0  
 
To ensure that MG electricity demand is satisfied, the participants purchased 75,153.5 kW 
electricity from the main grid, which is 16.48% of annual electricity demand. The local micro 
92 
 
sources such as solar PV and battery storage unit provide 381,488kW of electricity to the MG 
annually, of which the amount of electricity sells to the utility grid is 55,808.5kW. Within the 
participants of MG, the amount of electricity transfer in a year is 8,541kW, which is 1.9% of 
annual electricity demand.  Figure 5.5 shows the contribution to MG energy demand. 
Table 5.6: The annual amount of Electricity transfer between sites in Grid-Connected Mode. 
Site Amount of Electricity Transferred (kW) 
From To 
 
School Residential Building 328.5 
Fire Station Residential Building 73 
Hospital Residential Building 36.5 
Fire Station Restaurant 730 
Hotel Residential Building 73 
School Hotel 2007.5 
Restaurant Hotel 730 
Fire Station Hotel 255.5 
Residential Building Restaurant 1679 
School Restaurant 1241 
School Hospital 255.5 
Residential Building Hotel 949 
Fire Station School 182.5 
Total 8541 
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Figure 5.5: Contribution of MG Energy Demand in Grid-Connected mode. 
B   Energy Scheduling in Islanded Mode 
In islanded mode of operation, the variation in demand must be met by local generated 
electricity supply, if there is any imbalance between demand and supply, there would be poor 
power stability and even poor quality of power supply. Table 5.7 shows the energy scheduling 
in Islanded mode. In this case, the main grid is absent and thus, MG utilizes only the local 
micro-sources (local generation) to meet the load demand. At this time, a diesel generator is 
only the dispatchable source to back up the non-dispatchable source (solar PV) during this 
mode of operation.  
                           From the load demand profile in Figure 5.4a and generation schedule in columns 1 for each 
participant in Table 5.7, we observe that the operation of diesel generator for each participant 
changes according to the load demand. As usual, the battery is charged when there is high solar 
radiation and discharged when solar radiation is low, which acts as a storage device for solar 
PV in the MG. As seen in this table, the combinations of the solar PV, diesel generator, and the 
battery as a storage unit are adapted to answer the power load variations. However, in the grid-
connected mode, 16.48% of energy is imported from the main grid, which implies that the 
diesel generator should not be operated every time to reduce the fuel cost. For example, 
Local site 
consumption
82%
Electricity transfer 
between sites
2%
Imported electricity 
from main grid
16%
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between the hours of 1a.m. to 6a.m the solar generation is operating, thus, a diesel generator 
and a battery are used to meet the load demand. During these periods, load demands are low in 
some participants, but high in other participants. In this case, some diesel generators have to 
be interrupted while others are uninterrupted. For some diesel generators that tripping off at 
certain times of the day, their power deficits in that site would be covered by the power of other 
participants. For example, at 1am to 6am restaurant, residential building, and hospital have 
their diesel generators turned ON to cope with the power deficits and sell power to other 
participants in need of power. At this time, diesel generators of other participants are in off 
state. 
 At 7 a.m. to 5p.m, the solar PV system production supply is used to meet the load demand. At 
this time, diesel generators for all the participants are off and the battery charged up similar to 
the case of grid-connected generation scheduling and energy transfer amongst the participant of 
MG is possible. In the case, when solar PV suddenly reduces, all the diesel generators and battery 
are turned on to keep balance between production and consumption. For example, at 6p.m to 
9pm, we observe that nearly all the participants of MG have a high electricity demand, thus, the 
diesel generators and battery are used to meet the load demand to cover the power deficit. At 
10pm to 12pm, demand is less in some participants and high in other participants (as indicated 
in the load profile). In this case, the battery storage unit of each participant is discharged with 
the same power value to meet the load demand.  For example, hotel, restaurant and residential 
building have high electricity demand. Therefore, the diesel generators for school, hotel and 
residential building are on to cover the load demand, whereas, the diesel generators for other 
participants are de-energized to reduce the use of fuel and lengthen the life span of the generators. 
The battery scheduling for this mode of operation is the same as that of grid-connected mode as 
shown in Figure 5.2. 
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                   Table 5.7: Generation Schedule of the Participants in Islanded mode  
Time 
(Hrs) 
School   (kW) Hotel  (kW) 
Restaurant  
(kW) 
Fire Station  
(kW) 
Residential 
Building (kW) Hospital  (kW) 
Total 
Excess 
Elect. 
(kW) 
Total 
Electricity 
Transf. 
(kW) 
Own 
Gen 
E/D 
Own 
Gen 
E/D 
Own 
Gen 
E/D 
Own 
Gen 
E/D 
Own 
Gen 
E/D 
Own 
Gen 
E/D   
1  2.1  0  2.1  -0.2  5.4  -3.5  2  -0.1  5.5 1.8  5  2  3.8  3.8 
2  2.1   0  2.1  -0.2  5.4  -3.5  2  -0.1  5.5  1.8  5 2  3.8  3.8 
3  2.1   0  2.1  -0.2 5.4  -3.5  2  -0.1  5.5  1.8  5  2  3.8  3.8 
4  2.1 0  2.1  -0.2  5.4  -3.5  2  -0.1  5.5  1.8  5  2  3.8  3.8 
5  2.1 0  2.3  0  5.6  -3.3  2.3  0.2  5.6  1.9  5.3  2.3   4.4  3.3 
6  2.7 0.6  2.5  0.2  5.8  -3.1  2.4  0.3  5.8  2.1  5.9  2.9  5.5 3.1 
7  5.3  3.2  5.3  -4  5.6  2.1  5.3  2  5.5  -0.1  5.4  0.9  8.2  4.1 
8  7.7  5.6  7.2  -2.1  7.8  4.3  6.5  3.2  7.3  1.7  6.3  1.8  16.6  2.1 
9  10.2  -0.5  9  -2.6  9.5  0.6  7.9  1.1  10.5  3  7.8  0.5  5.2  3.1 
10  11.7  1  10.9  -0.7  11.4  2.5  8.4  1.6  11.5  4  8.5  1.2  10.3  0.7 
11  12.8  2.1  12.1  0.5  12.6  3.7  9.5  2.7  12.6  5.1  9.6  2.3  16.4  0 
12  13  2.3  12.8  1.2  13.1  -4.6  10  3.2  13  5.5  10  2.7  14.9  4.6 
13  15  4.3  14.8  3.2  15  6.1  10  3.2  15  7.5  10  2.7  26.8  0 
14  14.8  4.1  14.8  3.2  15  6.1  9.8 3  14.6  7.1  9.7  2.4  25.9  0 
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Time 
(Hrs) 
School   (kW) Hotel  (kW) 
Restaurant  
(kW) 
Fire Station  
(kW) 
Residential 
Building (kW) Hospital  (kW) 
Total 
Excess 
Elect. 
(kW) 
Total 
Electricity 
Transf. 
(kW) 
Own 
Gen 
E/D 
Own 
Gen 
E/D 
Own 
Gen 
E/D 
Own 
Gen 
E/D 
Own 
Gen 
E/D 
Own 
Gen 
E/D 
  
15  14.3  3.6  13.9  2.3  14.5  5.6  9.3  2.5  14.2  6.7  9.1  1.8  22.5  0 
16  12.9  2.2  12.4  0.8  13.1  4.2  8.5  1.7  12.8  5.3  8.7  1.4  15.6  0 
17  10.7  0  10.2  -1.4  10.8  1.9  7.1  0.3  10.6  3.1  7.2  -0.1  5.3  1.5 
18  11.7  7.4  11.7  2.4  11.8  -5.9  9.9  5.8  11.5  17.1  10  4.6  20.2  13 
19 11.1  6.8  11.2  1.9  11.2  -6.5  9.6  5.5  10.6  -8  9.8 4.4  18.6  14.5 
20  10.9  6.6  10.8  1.5  10.9  -6.8  9.5  5.4  10.4  -8.2  9.5 4.1  17.6  15 
21  10.5  6.7  10.6  1.3  10.7  -7  9.2  5.1  10.1  -8.5  9.3 3.9  16.5  15.5 
22  2.1  0  2.1  -0.2  5.4  -3.5  2  -0.1  5.5  1.8  5  2  3.8  3.8 
23  2.1  0  2.1  -0.2  5.4  -3.5  2  -0.1  5.5  1.8  5  2  3.8  3.8 
24  2.1  2.1  2.3  2.1  8.9  5.4  2.1  2  3.7  5.5  3  2  3.8  3.8 
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where  Own gen. =Own generation schedule, E/D= Excess/deficit. Negative sign under E/D 
column means deficit.  
 Table 5.8 shows the amount of energy transfer between the sites on an hourly basis. It can be 
observed that the amount of energy transfer in the morning was very low due to low power 
consumption at that time. For example, at 1a.m. to 6am, only the restaurant has a high 
electricity demand of 8.9kWh, whereas other participants have relatively low power demand 
and hence, low power transfer. In the afternoon, nearly all participants have sufficient solar 
production to cope with their electricity demand hence, no electricity transfer occurs in some 
hours of the day. For example, at 1pm to 4pm, no electricity transfer occurs between the 
participants of MG.  
At 6pm to 9pm, the amount of electricity transfer is very high, this is largely due to the high 
electricity demand in some sites in which their generation cannot cope with such demand at that 
time. To utilized energy efficiently, there is a need to exchange energy with other participants 
with surplus energy. Between the hours of 10pm to 12 midnight, apart from the restaurant, there 
is relatively low power demand thus, facilitation of low electricity transfer occurs among the 
participants. 
Table 5.9 shows the annual electricity transfer among sites. The total amount of electricity 
transfer in a year is 37,590.5kW, which is 8.2% of annual energy demand and the local site 
consumption is 419,052kW, which is 91.8% of annual electricity demand. Figure 5.6 shows the 
MG energy demand contribution in islanded mode.   
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Table 5.8: Hourly Electricity Transfer between Sites in islanded mode 
Time (hr) Site Amount of Electricity transferred (kW) 
 
From To 
 
1 Hospital Restaurant 2 
Residential 
Building 
Restaurant 1.5 
Residential 
Building 
Fire Station 0.1 
Residential 
Building 
Hotel 0.2 
2 Hospital Restaurant 2 
Residential 
Building 
Restaurant 1.5 
Residential 
Building 
Fire Station 0.1 
Residential 
Building 
Hotel 0.2 
3 Hospital Restaurant 2 
Residential 
Building 
Restaurant 1.5 
Residential 
Building 
Fire Station 0.1 
Residential 
Building 
Hotel 0.2 
4 Hospital Restaurant 2 
Residential 
Building 
Restaurant 1.5 
Residential 
Building 
Fire Station 0.1 
Residential 
Building 
Hotel 0.2 
5 Hospital Restaurant 2.3 
Residential 
Building 
Restaurant 1 
6 Hospital Restaurant 2.9 
Residential 
Building 
Restaurant 0.2 
7 Nil Nil 0 
8 School Hotel 2.1 
9 Residential 
Building 
Hotel 3.1 
10 School Hotel 0.7 
11 Nil Nil 0 
12 Residential 
Building 
Restaurant 4.6 
13 Nil Nil 0 
14 Nil Nil 0 
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Time (hr) Site Amount of Electricity transferred (kW) 
 From To  
15 Nil Nil 0 
16 Nil Nil  0 
17 Restaurant Hotel 1.4 
Restaurant Hospital 0.1 
18 School Residential 
Building 
7.1 
Fire Station Restaurant 5.5 
Hotel Restaurant 0.4 
19 School Residential 
Building 
6.8 
Fire Station Restaurant 5.5 
Hotel Residential 
Building 
1.2 
Hospital Restaurant 1 
20 School Restaurant 6.5 
Hotel Restaurant 0.3 
Fire Station Residential 
Building 
5.4 
Hospital Residential 
Building 
2.8 
21 School Restaurant 6.2 
Hotel Restaurant 0.8 
Fire Station Residential 
Building 
5.1 
Hospital Residential 
Building 
3.4 
22 Hospital Restaurant 2 
Residential 
Building 
Restaurant 1.5 
Residential 
Building 
Fire Station 0.1 
Residential 
Building 
Hotel 0.2 
23 Hospital Restaurant 2 
Residential 
Building 
Restaurant 1.5 
Residential 
Building 
Fire Station 0.1 
Residential 
Building 
Hotel 0.2 
24 Hospital Restaurant 2 
Residential 
Building 
Restaurant 1.5 
Residential 
Building 
Fire Station 0.1 
Residential 
Building 
Hotel 0.2 
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Table 5.9: The annual amount of Electricity transfer between sites in islanded mode 
Site Amount of Electricity Transferred in a Year (kW) 
Hospital Restaurant 77044.5 
Residential Building Restaurant 5945.5 
Residential Building Fire Station 255.5 
Residential Building Hotel 1642.5 
School Hotel 1022 
Restaurant Hotel 511 
School Residential Building 5000.5 
Fire Station Restaurant 4015 
Hotel Restaurant 547.5 
Hotel Residential Building 438 
School Restaurant 4635.5 
Fire Station Residential Building 3832.5 
Hospital Residential Building 2263 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Contribution of MG Electricity Demand in islanded mode. 
5.3   Equivalent Lifetime Profit (𝐸𝐿𝑃𝑠
𝐿) lower bounds 
For the case study, the price of the electricity imported from the main grid is 0.17$/kWh and 
the price of the electricity exported to the grid is 0.0131$/kWh. The equivalent lower profit 
Local site 
Consumption
8%
Electricity 
Transfer 
between sites
92%
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bounds (status-quo profit) in grid-connected and islanded mode are determined according to 
main grid scenario profit and micro-grid scenario profit respectively (i.e. optimized lifetime 
profits). By maximizing the profit of each participant (i.e. maximize (4.22) subject to (4.32), 
(4.41) – (4.44) in grid-connected mode and maximize (4.29) subject to (4.43) – (4.466) in 
islanded mode, the optimal results are shown in optimized lifetime profit in Table 5.10. 
Table 5.10: Determination of equivalent lower profit bound ( 𝐸𝐿𝑃𝑠
𝐿 ) of the participants 
 Operation 
Strategy 
School Hotel Restaurant Fire 
Station 
Residential 
Building 
Hospital 
Optimized 
Lifetime profit  
(US $) 
Islanded mode 24411 24722 25437 23452 24851 24158 
Grid-
connected 24311 24499 24925 23402 24735 24046 
𝐸𝐿𝑃𝑠
𝐿  or 
Status-quo 
Profit (US $) 
Islanded mode 24411 24722 25437 23452 24851 24158 
Grid-
connected 25527 25725 26171 24572 25972 25248 
  
In promoting the implementation of the micro-grid, the minimum equivalent lower bound profit 
(i.e. 𝐸𝐿𝑃𝑠
𝐿 or Status-quo Profit) is assigned based on the main grid scenario profit in grid-
connected mode and based on MG scenario profit in islanded mode. It is expected that the 
participants of micro-grid in each location will not have the profit lower than the assigned 
equivalent lower profit bound (𝐸𝐿𝑃𝐿 or status-quo profit)  In this research work, 105% of the 
optimized annual cost is assigned for grid-connected and 100% is used in islanded mode as 
shown in  the second column in Table 5.10. 
5.4   Application of cooperative game theory using the Nash  
Bargaining Solution 
In order to show the performance of the cooperative game theory using the Nash bargaining 
solution, the case study of Table 5.11 is simulated in both grid-connected and islanded modes. 
Six case studies are investigated as shown in Table 5.12. 
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Table 5.11: Simulated Case Studies 
Case Study Types of Micro-grid Operation Participant Strategy 
1 Islanded Mode Independent 
2 Islanded Mode Cooperative 
3 Grid-connected Mode (Buying and selling 
electricity) 
Independent 
4 Grid-connected Mode (Buying and selling 
electricity) 
Cooperative 
5 Grid-connected Mode (Buying electricity 
only) 
Independent 
6 Grid-connected Mode (Buying electricity 
only) 
Cooperative 
A      Micro-grid in islanded mode (case studies 1-2 Table 5.11)  
In islanded mode, the main grid is disconnected, thus, MG acts as an independent entity and 
manages its production and sales of energy. Table 5.12 compares the overall expenses and 
profits of test study. Case study 1 takes cognizance of the participant that manages its sales 
independently. Obviously, this case is the most expensive strategy. In case study 2, the MG 
manages its production and sales through the cooperation of its participants. The overall 
expense in case study 1 is $175,935, which reduces by 2.5% in case study 2 to $171,472 due 
to cooperation of the participants. The overall profit of the participants in case studies 1 and 2 
is zero, because within the micro-grid, revenue obtain from selling electricity to one participant 
is the cost of purchase electricity for other participant.  
B     Micro-grid in grid-connected mode (case studies 3-6 Table 5.10) 
We consider four case studies (Table 5.12 case studies 3-6) to investigate the performance of 
the cooperative game theory, the Nash bargaining solution in a grid-connected mode with the 
possibility of power exchange with the utility grid. In all the case studies (3-4) of Table 5.12, 
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the micro-grid can buy/sell electricity from/to the utility grid, while in the case studies (5-6) of 
Table 5.12, it can only buy electricity from the utility grid. 
Table 5.12: Comparison of overall expense and total income of the Participants in the case 
studies  
Case Study (Table 5.11) Overall Expenses $ Income $ Overall Profit $ 
1 175,935 175,935 0 
2 171,472 171,472 0 
3 167,806 176,510 8,704 
4 145,918 155,257 9,339 
5 173,171 173,171 0 
6 171,602 171,602 0 
The overall expenses compare with the total income that is obtained in the grid-connected mode 
is shown in case studies (3-4) of Table 5.12. It can be seen that for the case study 3, the overall 
expense is $167,806 and the total revenue generated is $176,510 when the participants 
independently manage their production and sales, thus, resulting in a saving of 5.2%. When the 
participants cooperate with each other for mutual benefit as in case study 4, the expense 
incurred is $145,918, and income is $155,257, which yield an increase of 6.4%. By comparing 
the two profits in case studies 3 and 4 of Table 5.12, it can be seen that there is a sharp increase 
of 7.3% in favour of the cooperative game theory approach.    
In case studies 5 and 6 of Table 5.12, the micro-grid only purchases electricity from the utility 
grid. Therefore, the overall profit will be zero, which agrees with the results obtained in [134]. 
In this case, the overall expenses are $173171 and $171,602 in case studies 5 and 6 respectively. 
It is, therefore, evident that the use of cooperative game theory usually reduces the expenses 
incurred by the participants. In cooperative game theory approach, the participants can jointly 
purchase/sell electricity from/to the main grid through the micro-grid central controller. In this 
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case, the MGCC acts as a mediator to coordinate the energy transfer amongst the micro-grid 
participants. We can then say that the cooperative game approach is not only beneficial to the 
participants but to the energy providers as well. 
C              Individual Profit Allocation in Micro-grid 
Figure 5.7 shows the profit of individual participants when they cooperate with each other and 
when they selfishly maximize their individual benefits in grid-connected mode. In this case, 
the fire station has the lowest profits and restaurant record the highest profits. Comparing the 
profit level of the participants, the following changes are observed. In the first case, the fire 
station has a profit of $25441 when it is independent, but when the participants cooperate using 
the Nash bargaining solution, the profit increases by 2.42% to $26056. The restaurant, on the 
other hand, has a profit of $28558 under independent scenario, and the profit of $29005 when 
cooperating with each other, which represents an increase of 1.6%. This shows that the use of 
cooperative game based on Nash bargaining solution ensures an increase in profit of the 
participants compare to the situation when they independently maximize their profits. 
In islanded mode, similar deduction is obtained with the exception that the fire station has an 
increase of 2.8% and restaurant’s profits is increased by 2.1% due to the cooperation of the 
participants as indicated in Figure 5.8. 
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Figure 5.7: Profit of the participants in grid-connected mode 
 
 
Figure 5.8: Profit of the Participants in islanded mode 
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5.5 Application of Cooperative Game Theory using Generalized Nash 
Bargaining Solution. 
To find the generalized Nash bargaining solution we shall consider the Nash bargaining 
solution with negotiation power indicator. We then, maximize Nash type objective function 
given in (4.24) and (4.31) in both grid-connected and islanded mode respectively subject to 
their listed constraints.  
A    Effect of applying negotiation power indicator 
For the optimal solution obtain in Figure 5.9 in grid-connected, the transfer price level for all 
the participants needs to be specified before solving the problem. We also need to specify the 
negotiation power indicator for each participant. We consider eight transfer price levels one at 
a time for all the participants. In the first case, we assume that all the six participants have the 
same negotiation power thus 𝛼1, 𝛼2, 𝛼3, 𝛼4, 𝛼5 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼6 are all set to 1 and the transfer price is 
fixed at $0.039. For this problem, TLBO algorithm was used to obtain the optimal solution. 
When the generalized Nash bargaining solution is used with given lower profit, the objective 
functions in (4.24) is maximized subject to (4.32) - (4.44) in grid-connected mode and in 
islanded mode, the objective function (4.31) is maximized subject to (4.33) – (4.38), (4.43)– 
(4.46). Considering the profit allocation mechanism, i.e., the Individual participant obtains the 
same profit under this scenario. The optimal solution is shown in Figure 5.9. 
We consider the possibility of having different negotiation power in which the negotiation 
power n, for example, determines the utility preference of the participants. A large value of n 
indicates that the participants will obtain a higher profit than that of other participants. 
Therefore, the necessary tools are provided by game theory to carry out the weighted fair profit 
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among the participants, although the savings in the distributed case could be smaller for the 
other participants. 
In order to investigate the possible scenario with the propose model, there is a need to consider 
the differences in participant negotiation power. In this case, only the negotiation power 
indicator for a participant needs to change while the other information remains the same as in 
case 1. To favour certain participant, we assume the negotiation power of the School to be 
higher than that of all other participants. Therefore, we set 𝛼1 = 1.06 and 𝛼2 = 𝛼3 = 𝛼4, =
𝛼5 = 𝛼6 = 1  Again, the problem is solved directly using TLBO algorithm. Figure 5.9 shows 
the optimum profit allocation of each participant in grid-connected mode. As can be seen, due 
to its higher negotiation power, the school obtained a higher profit when compared to case 1. 
For example, for transfer prices of 0.039$/kWh the school surplus increases from the $27,237 
to $35,044, which is 28.7% increase as indicated in Figure 5.9. This is possible because of the 
need to favour this participant, and thus reduce the profit of other participants. In islanded 
mode, the main grid is disconnected and the diesel generator is substituted to deliver the power. 
The same condition as in the grid-connected is applied and the optimal solution is obtained as 
shown in Figure 5.10, which shows that the school surplus  increases from $25440 to $33085  
by 30% due to school having a higher bargaining /negotiation power. 
The generalized Nash bargaining solution has the negotiating power indicator, which 
determines whether to favour certain participant. If by consensus the participants of MG deem 
it fit to favour certain participant (i.e. because such participant is structurally different) the 
negotiation power for such participant will be higher than other participants. On the other hand, 
if by consensus no participant is to be favoured, then all the participants will be assigned the 
same bargaining power. This means that the symmetrical axiom is satisfied. When using the 
proposed fairness approach the participant may have higher profit than the other participants. These 
participants could sacrifice their benefits to achieve mutual benefits.  
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Figure 5.9: Optimized profit allocation profile for all participants in grid-connected mode with 
the school having a higher negotiation power. 
 
Figure 5.10: Optimized profit allocation profile for islanded mode with the school having a 
higher negotiation power. 
B   Effect of Transfer Prices 
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transfer prices of the electricity within the micro-grid are taken as 0.039-0.109 $/kWh and the 
optimal results are shown in Tables 5.13 and 5.14. These results are obtained using the 
cooperative game theory with the same negotiation power indicators. 
In the MG system, the intra-electricity transfer price does not affect the total profit; this is 
because the profit obtained when electricity is sold to the participant means the cost of 
purchasing electricity for other participants. The total profit obtain by the participants when in 
grid-connected mode for the cooperative game theory for any transfer price is approximately 
$165,157 and is about 7.8% of the status-quo profit as shown in Tables 5.13 and 5.14. With the 
school having higher negotiation power, which cost a drop in the profit of other participants as 
in Table 5.14, the variation of transfer price still maintains the profit level of other participants 
above the status-quo profit level. The savings for each participant is fairly distributed. Although 
the profit varies differently in the fixed electricity transfer price and the total profit of the whole 
micro-grid is approximately the same. It is, therefore, obvious that none of the participants have 
profits lower than the status-quo profit (lower profit as indicated in Table 5.10). 
Similarly, in the islanded mode of operation, the cooperative game theory is used to maintain 
the profit of each participant in the site above the status-quo profit with variation in transfer 
prices. Table 5.17 shows the variation of transfer price when different negotiation power is 
applied, just as in the case of grid-connected mode. In this case, the total profits obtain by the 
participants in cooperative game theory for any transfer price is $161,969 and is about 10.2% 
above the status-quo profit. 
Case 2: 
In this case 2, the participants independently manage their resources and therefore not using 
game theory in both grid-connected and islanded mode. By maximizing (4.222) subject to 
(4.32) – (4.44) in grid-connected and maximizing (4.29) subject to (4.33) to (4.38) and (4.43) 
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to (4.45) in islanded mode, the optimal results obtained are shown in Tables 5.16 to 5.18. The 
optimal results obtained in the simulation also vary differently depending on the transfer prices. 
The total profit obtained with the participants without game theory in grid-connected for any 
transfer price is approximately $161,969 and is about 5.7% of the status-quo profit as shown 
in Table 5.15. 
By comparing the results obtained in Table 5.15 with status-quo profit as shown in Table 5.10, 
we observe that some participants have obtained profit less than the assigned status-quo profit 
at a certain transfer prices, and even less than the optimized annual cost. For example, in a fire 
station, in Table 5.15, for the transfer prices of 0.089, 0.099, and 0.109$/kWh, the profit obtain 
is less than status-quo profit level and at the same time less than the optimized annual costs. 
Again, for hospital, in Table 5.15 at transfer prices 0,099$/kWh and 0.109$/kWh, the profits 
are $25095 and $24001 and the status-quo profit is $25248. This implies that both the hospital 
and fire station have negative profits at certain transfer prices. The negative profit is because 
of having a profit lower than specified lower profit (status-quo profit) as in cooperative game 
theory NBS.   
In addition, for islanded mode of operation, the total profit obtained with the participants 
without game theory for any transfer price is approximately $15609 and is about 6.2% of the 
status-quo profit as shown in Table 5.18. In this islanded mode, some participants do not 
benefit, the results indicate that some participants have their profits lower than the status-quo 
profits. This is because lower profit level is not considered in this case and may lead to high 
profit in some participants and negative profit in other participants, whereas, in a cooperative 
approach some participants could sacrifice their benefits to achieve mutual benefits [3]. For 
example, for fire station, in Table 5.18, the transfer prices are 0.099 and 0.109$/kWh and the 
optimal simulation results obtained are $23365 and $23224 respectively, which is lower than 
the status-quo profits (i.e. $23452). Ditto for hospital, when the transfer price is 0.109$/kWh. 
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These solutions imply that some participants may not benefit when transfer prices are varied 
as the higher transfer prices may become unbearable for some participants to make profit 
without been helped. 
Table 5.13: Optimal results for cooperative game theory with the same negotiation power in 
grid-connected mode 
Transfer 
Price $/kWh 
School $ Hotel $ Restaurant 
$ 
Fire 
Station $ 
Residential 
Building $ 
Hospital 
$ 
Total $ 
0.039 27237 27940 29005 26056 28029 26890 165157 
0.049 27001 27711 29562 25672 28563 26648 165157 
0.059 26910 27501 29687 25672 28537 26850 165157 
0.069 26891 27700 29500 25776 28480 26810 165157 
0.079 26751 27315 29828 25772 28540 26951 165157 
0.089 26714 26910 29468 26931 28468 26666 165157 
0.099 25990 27452 29754 26141 28755 27065 165157 
0.109 26421 27231 29665 26222 28664 26954 165157 
 
Table 5.14: Optimal results for cooperative game theory with the different negotiation power 
in grid-connected mode (i.e. when 𝛼1 = 1.06 (School) and 𝛼2 = 𝛼3 = 𝛼4, = 𝛼5 = 𝛼6 = 1) 
Transfer 
Price $/kWh 
School $ Hotel $ Restaurant 
$ 
Fire 
Station $ 
Residential 
Building $ 
Hospital 
$ 
Total $ 
0.039 35044 26358 27363 24581 26443 25368 165157 
0.049 34784 26112 27725 24926 26211 25399 165157 
0.059 34652 25944 27870 24670 26521 25500 165157 
0.069 34515 26411 27185 25114 26322 25610 165157 
0.079 34261 26351 27921 24981 26222 25421 165157 
0.089 34731 25950 27531 25623 25991 25331 165157 
0.099 34992 25883 26899 25723 25983 25677 165157 
0.109 34589 25931 27367 25332 26264 25674 165157 
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Table 5.15 Optimal results without cooperative game theory in grid-connected mode 
Transfer 
Price 
$/kWh 
School $ Hotel $ Restaurant 
$ 
Fire 
Station $ 
Residential 
Building $ 
Hospital $ Total $ 
0.039 26690 27432 28558 25441 27526 26322 161969 
0.049 26721 27582 28983 24671 27579 26433 161969 
0.059 26822 27389 29542 24622 27590 26004 161969 
0.069 26804 27970 28739 24798 27980 25678 161969 
0.079 26873 28446 28323 24671 28245 25411 161969 
0.089 26927 28570 29842 23304 28002 25324 161969 
0.099 26962 28674 29794 23341 28103 25095 161969 
0.109 27838 28746 29655 23384 28345 24001 161969 
 
Table 5.16: Optimal results with cooperative game theory in the Islanded mode  
Transfer Price 
$/kWh 
School 
$ 
Hotel $ Restauran
t $ 
Fire 
Station $ 
Residential 
Building $ 
Hospita
l $ 
Total $ 
0.039 25440 26210 27377 24925 27096 25048 156096 
0.049 25422 26661 27249 24269 27521 24974 156096 
0.059 25405 26463 27401 24605 27432 24790 156096 
0.069 24901 26278 27600 25085 27611 24621 156096 
0.079 24816 26104 27800 25254 27701 24421 156096 
0.089 24803 26349 27920 25186 26981 24857 156096 
0.099 24923 26299 28000 25111 26851 24912 156096 
0.109 24865 26811 27826 24806 26791 24997 156096 
 
Table 5.17: Optimal results with cooperative game theory in the Islanded mode with different 
negotiation power (i.e., when 𝛼1 = 1.06 (School) and 𝛼2 = 𝛼3 = 𝛼4, = 𝛼5 = 𝛼6 = 1) 
Transfer Price 
$/kWh 
School 
$ 
Hotel $ Restauran
t $ 
Fire 
Station $ 
Residential 
Building $ 
Hospita
l $ 
Total $ 
0.039 32085 24726 25828 23521 25467 24469 156096 
0.049 31829 25121 25563 23562 25763 24258 156096 
0.059 31732 25321 26000 23611 25221 24211 156096 
0.069 31654 25422 25658 23617 25101 24644 156096 
0.079 31239 25477 26115 23660 25076 24529 156096 
0.089 31286 24877 26410 24006 25095 24422 156096 
0.099 31521 24811 26110 23799 25644 24211 156096 
0.109 31414 24738 26000 24046 25539 24359 156096 
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Table 5.18: Optimal results without cooperative game theory in the islanded mode 
Transfer Price 
$/kWh 
School 
$ 
Hotel $ Restaurant 
$ 
Fire 
Station $ 
Residential 
Building $ 
Hospital $ Total $ 
0.039 25440 26210 27377 24925 27096 25048 156096 
0.049 25321 26100 27096 25002 27602 24975 156096 
0.059 25205 25900 27235 25473 27451 24832 156096 
0.069 25009 26470 27474 24932 27432 24779 156096 
0.079 25103 26500 27009 24875 27987 24622 156096 
0.089 25339 26007 27150 24862 28199 24539 156096 
0.099 25921 26566 27633 23365 28322 24289 156096 
0.109 25893 26678 27877 23224 28415 24009 156096 
 
5.6   Comparison of Algorithms for Different Optimization Techniques 
In this section, three heuristic optimization methods are presented. 
A          Genetic Algorithm (GA) 
The working principle of a genetic algorithm (GA) has to do with the population of strings, 
which consists of generations. A string can be divided into many substrings and each of them 
denotes a problem variable. In the energy management system, the problem variables represent 
the profits of each participant. The participant of a micro-grid corresponds to a substring. The 
decision on the length of each substring is based on the maximum/minimum on the profit of 
the participant it represents and accuracy of the solution desired. The choice of string length is 
based on a trade-off between the accuracy of the solution and the time to take in solving the 
problem. Although, the longer the string, the better the accuracy, the solution time will be 
higher. 
The procedures for solving GA are as follows: 
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1. Select the possible population size, number of generations, length of substring and the   
number of runs 
2. In the first generation, the initial coded string is generated as population members. 
3. Decode the population in the string to obtain the profit of each participant 
4.  Evaluate the surplus of all the participants. 
5. Determine the fitness value of the population members. 
6. Carry out selection based on reproduction. Repeat the procedures 2 – 6 for the first trial for 
all the numbers of generations and the maximum profit is noted. This is done repeatedly for 
the selected number of trials and the maximum for the augmented profit is taken as the solution. 
Table 5.19: Parameter values for the GA-based energy management of micro-grid 
Control Parameter Value 
  
Number of generations 300 
Number of design variable 6 
Population size 60 
Selection mode Tournament 
Crossover method Directional based crossover 
Crossover rate 0.9 
Mutation method Non-uniform 
Mutation rate 0.1 
 
B          Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) 
The steps used in the algorithm are presented as follows 
Step 1: Input the relevant data needed such as load demand, power generation profiles and all 
other data necessary for the computation process. 
Step 2: Initialize the profits and the status-quo profits of each participant as an operation         
parameter of PSO.  
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Step 3: Compute the objective function for each population vector. 
Step 4: Generate the position and velocity of the particle in a certain dimension and at a certain 
iteration. 
Step 7: Compute the objective function for each participant location. 
Step 8: Determine 𝑝𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 and 𝑔𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 of the swarm. 
Step 9: Update the velocity of the particle and the position of the particle. 
Table 5.20: Parameter values of the PSO-based energy management of micro-grid. 
Control Parameter Value 
Number of iterations 300 
Number of design variables 6 
Population size 60 
Initial weight 1 
Inertial weight damping ratio 0.99 
C1 (learning factor) 2 
C 2(learning factor) 1.5 
 
C.       Teaching-Learning-Based Optimization (TLBO) 
In a search space, a group of learners, which consists of a population in TLBO is randomly 
generated and is bounded by the number of subjects (or design variable). The number of 
optimization parameters used represents the number of subjects offered to the students. The 
objective function of the optimization problem is the output of the learners. It is through 
learning of the learners that the teacher searches in TLBO for the optimal value. There are two 
phases of the working principle of TLBO, the teacher’s phase and the learner’s phase. In the 
teacher’s phase, the learning is done through a teacher, whereas, in the learner’s phase, the 
learning is accomplished through interactions with other learners. 
The step by step procedures of TLBO is as follows: 
1. Randomly initialize the population in bounded search space. 
2. Teacher’s phase – The objective function is computed for each design variable. 
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3. The mean value of each design variable offered to the learners is arranged column-wise. 
4. Set the generation count. 
5. The highest value of the learners is chosen as maximum fitness function, which is considered 
as a teacher of the subject. The best teacher aims at changing the average from ‘mean’ to 
‘new mean’. 
6. Evaluate the difference between the new average mean and the new current mean by using 
teaching factor. 
7. Update the learner’s knowledge by adding the difference mean and the existing learner’s 
population. 
8. Learner’s phase – In this phase, the operation of TLBO enables the learners to interact with 
each other, thereby increasing their knowledge. Randomly select another learner to update 
the learner’s knowledge. 
9. Generation count updated. Check the criterion for termination, otherwise, proceed to step 2.    
Table 5.21: Parameter values for TLBO-based energy management of micro-grid 
  Control Parameter Value 
Number of generations 300 
Number of design variable 6 
Population size 60 
Rand 0 – 1 
Selection method Elitism 
 
5.7     Comparison of the Algorithms 
A   Justification of parameters used in the algorithms 
In order to justify the adequacy of some common parameters use in the heuristic technique, the 
variation number of generations/iterations is investigated for both grid-connected and islanded 
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mode. In this case, the population size is fixed at 60, then the number of generations/iterations 
varies. Figures 5.11 and 5.12 show the comparison of number of generations/iteratios for 
system to converge as a function of exact value when population size is fixed at 60 for the three 
hueristics optimization techniques i.e. TLBO, PSO, and GA for both grid-connected and 
islanded mode. 
Through 20 trials, for grid-connected mode in TLBO method, there is rapid increase in average 
exact value as the number of generation increases in the range of generation between 50 and 
190. However, between 190 to 198, there is a slight increase in the exact value. At 200, there 
is no more increase in exact value  and therefore, the recommended number of generations is 
200, which corresponds to a exact value of $2389. In the case of PSO, the graph shows a similar 
increase in the number of iterations just like TLBO but the increase is extended to 240. Hence, 
for PSO, the recommended number of iterations is 250, which corresponds to exact values of 
$2295.  For GA, the increase goes until it reaches 290 and the recommended number of 
iterations is 300, which corresponds to exact value of $2180. Therefore, for the fixed population 
size of 60, then the number of generations of 300 can be selected 
Similar deduction holds for islanded mode of operation of MG as shown in Figure 5.12. In this 
case, the recommended number of generations/iterations of 240 with exact values of $2260, 
280 with exact values of $2140, and 300 for a exact values of $1911 for TLBO, PSO and GA 
respectively. 
Therefore,  population size and number of generations/iterations 60 and 300 respectively to 
accommodate all the algorithms under investigation are selected. 
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Figure 5.11: Comparison of necessary number of generations/iterations for convergence for 
fixed population size of 60 in grid-connected mode. 
  
Figure 5.12: Comparison of necessary number of generations for convergence for fixed 
population size of 60 in islanded mode. 
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B.   Comparison of algorithms in terms of participant’s profits 
This system consists of six participant sites: Tables 5.22 and 5.23 listed all the statistic results 
that evolve the profit distribution, average profit each strategy and execution time in both grid-
connected and islanded mode.  
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed TLBO method, the profits allocation to the 
six participants are tested in both the grid-connected and the islanded mode using both the 
game theory (cooperative) and without the game theory (independent) approach. In this work, 
the propose TLBO method is compared with one traditional method, i.e. Lambda iteration 
method and heuristic methods, i.e. Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) and Genetic Algorithm 
(GA). At the same parameter setting (i.e. the number of generations and population size) we 
perform 20 trials using the four algorithms to indicate the variation during the processes and 
be able to compare the quality of the solutions and convergence characteristics. Through 20 
trials, the algorithms have different average profit distribution, different profit of each strategy 
and the different rate of convergence. Tables 5.22 and 5.23 showed the average profit 
distribution outlines of the optimal solution.  
In these two tables, it is observed that the TLBO obtained the highest profit distribution for 
each participant in both the grid-connected and islanded mode amongst the algorithms and 
therefore, having the highest solution quality, followed by PSO, GA and Lambda in that order. 
The closeness of the value of PSO to TLBO is due to ability of PSO to achieve better solution 
and convergence characteristics than GA. Some of the parameters such as crossover rate and 
mutation rates for GA, c1 and c2 for PSO have been selected based on guidelines in the literature. 
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Table 5.22: Comparison of the algorithms in grid-connected mode. 
Algorith
m 
Participant 
Strategy 
Profit of Each Participant ($) Av. 
Profit 
of 
each 
strateg
y ($) 
Simulatio
n time 
(sec.) 
Schoo
l 
Hotel Restaura
nt 
Fire 
Statio
n 
Residenti
al. 
Building 
Hospit
al 
Lambda Independe
nt 
25355 2606
1 
27130 24169 26150 25006 25645 5260 
Cooperati
ve 
25844 2657
1 
27663 24636 26665 25483 26144 
PSO Independe
nt 
26156 2688
4 
27987 24932 26976 25796 26622 1639 
Cooperati
ve 
27000 2759
9 
28410 25990 27766 26820 27261 
GA Independe
nt 
25889 2660
9 
27701 24678 26700 25533 26185 1658 
Cooperati
ve 
26788 2657
1 
28399 25986 27666 26811 26870 
TLBO Independe
nt 
26710 2751
0 
28560 25461 27499 26322 27010 759 
Cooperati
ve 
27300 2795
1 
28915 25994 28011 26887 27510 
 
Table 5.23: Comparison of the algorithms in Islanded mode. 
Algorith
m 
Participant 
Strategy 
Profit of Each Participant ($) Av. 
Profit 
of 
each 
strateg
y ($) 
Simulati
on time 
(sec.) 
School Hotel Restaura
nt 
Fire 
Statio
n 
Residenti
al 
Building 
Hospit
al 
Lambda Independe
nt 
22147 22299 22530 2189
0 
22318 22071 22209 5100 
Cooperativ
e 
23432 23570 23821 2315
5 
23601 23335 23486 
PSO Independe
nt 
23888 24053 24302 2361
2 
24074 23807 23956 1652 
Cooperativ
e 
24967 25085 25286 2491
9 
25168 25148 25096 
GA Independe
nt 
23391 23552 23796 2312
0 
23572 23311 23457 1667 
Cooperativ
e 
24210 24294 24564 2430
4 
24540 24583 24416 
TLBO Independe
nt 
24137 24304 24556 2385
8 
24325 24055 24206 774 
Cooperativ
e 
25367 25528 25772 2509
6 
25549 25287 25433 
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Figure 5.13 show the graphs of average simulation time in both grid-connected and islanded 
modes with different number of generations for the profit obtained in Tables 5.22 and 5.23. It 
is observed that the average simulation time obtained by the TLBO is smaller compared to 
other algorithms. This implies that the TLBO method saves computation time than all other 
algorithms under investigation. This is because TLBO method does not need any specific 
control parameter as we have in PSO and GA, thus, reducing the optimization parameters for 
solving any complex problem [97]. The results indicate the superior properties of the TLBO 
over other algorithms. The results obtained show the better computational efficiency of TLBO 
compared to other existing methods. The PSO is next to TLBO in terms of good performance. 
It also saves time compared with GA and Lambda methods. As compared with GA, PSO saves 
more time because it does not perform selection and crossover operation as GA does. The 
Lambda is the slowest of all the entire algorithms, as it takes a very long time to converge. 
With the Lambda, it converges slowly and therefore, takes more computation time than all 
other algorithms to converge as stated in [100]. 
A single run of any heuristic algorithm cannot show the performance of that method. The 
performance should be judged when the program is run for a certain number of trials, typically 
20 runs. A conclusion about the performance of any heuristic method depends largely on the 
number of trials use to obtain the results 
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 (a)  Grid-Connected Mode 
 
 (b)  Islanded mode 
Figure 5.13: Average Simulation Time Versus Number of Generations/iteration (a) Grid-
Connected mode (b) Islanded mode. 
Figures 5.14 and 5.15 show the graphs of average profit of both independent and cooperative 
in both islanded and grid-connected modes against the number of trials. These Figures show 
the distribution patterns of the best solution of each trial. It can be seen that almost all values 
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of the TLBO method are higher than other algorithms in both grid connected and island mode, 
which shows it consistency. The consistency of TLBO approach is due to the TLBO efficiency 
and the fewer parameters that involved during the renewal process. It also possesses simple 
concept, no specific algorithm parameters, rapid convergence and ease of implementation. 
TLBO has the best solution and convergence characteristics. The PSO also performs better 
than GA and Lambda. The Lambda performance is the least of them. 
mode (b) Islanded mode. 
  
(a)  Independent 
 
 
(a) Cooperative Strategy 
 
Figure 5.14: Average Profit of both independent and cooperative strategies on the number of Trials in 
Islanded mode. 
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(a)  Independent 
 
 
(b)    Cooperative 
Figure 5.15: Average Profit of both independent and cooperative strategies on the number of 
Trials in Grid-connected mode 
5.7     Summary 
In this chapter, the use of cooperative game theory using generalized Nash bargaining solution 
is applied to tackle problem of EMS in remote communities. More specifically, six local sites 
are used as a case study. It reveals that the use of cooperative game theory usually reduces the 
expenses incurred by the participants than to independently manage their sales or production. 
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It is also demonstrated that the fair weighted profit distribution amongst the participants can be 
achieved by using cooperative game theory based on the generalized Nash bargaining solution 
Furthermore, it is guaranteed that by participating in EMS using cooperative game theory based 
on generalized Nash bargaining solution a participant will obtain fair weighted profit 
distribution. Thus, it is rational for the participants to form coalition for mutual benefits, the 
weighted fairness in profit distribution is inherited from the use of cooperative game theory. 
Robustness of TLBO is also demonstrated in this chapter. It shows that TLBO possess superior 
qualities with high quality solution and convergence characteristics that are stable. The results 
obtained therefore, show that the propose method is indeed robust and capable of providing 
quality and efficient solution to energy management problems. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion and Future Works 
In this chapter, conclusion of the thesis and the future work directions are presented. 
6.1 Conclusions 
 From the thesis, it can be deduced that the generalized Nash bargaining solution is used to 
achieve weighted fair profit distribution amongst the MG participants. The proposed model 
combines the advantages of both Nash bargaining solution and generalized Nash bargaining 
solution to favour certain participants. Moreover, the TLBO algorithm is proposed to achieve 
optimal solution. The investigation reveals that the TLBO gives the highest quality solution 
and better convergence characteristics that are stable. 
The simulation results in this thesis can be summarized as follows: 
(a)  The energy management with overall profit allocation to the participants using cooperative 
game theory and without cooperative game theory. 
In grid-connected mode, a cooperative energy management is presented where the participants 
of the micro-grid can cooperate for mutual benefit and to utilize resources efficiently. A case 
study of six sites is considered and the solutions are empirically evaluated to show that 
cooperative game theory increases profit compare to when there is no game theory. In this case, 
overall expenses and total revenue generated are investigated and savings obtained are higher 
in cooperative game theory than when participants independently manage their resources and 
sales. In islanded mode, micro-grid is disconnected from the main grid thus, acting as an 
independent entity. Obviously, the mode of operation is very expensive. In this case, the overall 
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profit for both with game theory and without game theory is zero, mainly because the MG is 
islanded and overall revenue to be obtained from selling electricity to a participant means the 
cost of purchase electricity for another participant. 
(b)  Individual Profit allocation in micro-grid. 
The individual profit allocated to each participant of MG in both grid-connected and islanded 
mode was investigated. In the simulations, it was observed that higher profit is obtained when 
participants cooperate with each other compared with when the participants independently 
manage their own resources. The investigation is extended to a novel approach of a game theory 
using generalized Nash bargaining solution, when a particular participant needs to be favoured, 
therefore, such participant receives higher profit than other participants. The higher negotiation 
power is due to a participant that is different structurally from other participants and need to be 
favoured (i.e. the participant site to be favoured may be non-profit making establishment such 
as a school). However, any other participant site may be considered due to some other reasons 
to favour such participant. Under this condition, the participant with the different negotiation 
power indicators is assigned, so that the participant with higher bargaining power receives 
higher profit than other participants. Under this condition, cooperative game theory still 
maintain higher profit compared with when the participants independently manage their 
resources. 
By increasing the number of participant in the MG, both the total and individual profit would 
be increased, which depends largely on the pattern of the load demand (energy consumption) 
of the participants of MG. If peak power demand and energy consumption patterns of each 
participants are different from each other there would be more benefits. Higher income is 
derived by selling electricity to other participants than selling to the grid in grid-connected 
mode.  
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(c) Effect of different transfer prices on the profit of the participants. 
The effect of different transfer prices on the profit of each participant is investigated with game 
theory and without game theory in both grid-connected and islanded mode. In islanded mode, 
intra-electricity transfer price does not affect the total profit; this is because the profit obtained 
when electricity is sold to the participant means the cost of purchasing electricity from another 
participant, which actually agrees with reference [3]. However, the transfer prices actually have 
an effect on individual profit of the participants. This is because variation of transfer prices on 
individual profit of the participant in an independent mode may lead to negative profits. This 
is because no cooperation is involved to allow participants to make sacrifices for other 
participants using lower profit bound.  
From the simulation carried out, it is observed that for different transfer prices in cooperative 
game theory approach, all the participants benefited from MG, as their profit is above the 
status-quo profit, even when the profits accruable to participant decreases because of 
introduction of higher bargaining power assigned to a particular participant. 
When the participants without game theory are investigated, the variation of transfer prices 
causes many participants to incur negative profits in some transfer prices. This actually shows 
the great advantage of cooperative game theory approach over when game theory does not 
apply to EMS. 
(d)  The use of Teacher-Learning-Based Optimization method to solve energy management 
problem. 
An algorithm known as TLBO is used to solve energy management problem considering the 
constraints. TLBO is a heuristic algorithm use to optimize the solution to the EMS problem, 
while a cooperative game theory on the other hand, is a powerful tool is used to obtain a 
solution that is fairness with well-defined status-quo point. 
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 To show the effectiveness of TLBO method, the results obtained are compared with other 
heuristic method such as GA and PSO and one classical approach i.e. Lambda-iteration 
method. The results obtained demonstrate that the TLBO method possess superior qualities 
with a high quality solution and convergence characteristics.  
The thesis also investigates the contribution of intra-electricity transfer amongst the 
participants of MG. The research work shows that intra-transfer of electricity contributes 11% 
of energy demand to generation scheduling, whereas, in grid-connected mode, it only 
contributes 2% of energy demand because of the possible energy exchange with the main grid.  
6.2 Future Works 
The thesis investigates the problem of energy management system of micro-grid as regards 
profit distribution to the players. A lot of limitations and future works are identified. For the 
MG to be optimally design, the distances between sites are relatively small, so the energy 
management model considers no electricity loss. Also, the privacy of the participants operating 
in a big system, upgrade the system in a regular manner and EMS reliability issues have not 
been addressed. Such challenges and limitations may affect EMS operations.  
Based on the results obtained in the thesis, the proposed future works are described as follows: 
(a) Validating the developed models 
In the proposed EMS, simulation results are not validated. In the future work, validating the 
simulation results need to be added to the existing EMS. 
(b) Real time simulation 
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The issue such as real time simulation are not considered in the proposed EMS. This work can 
be extended to a real time simulation, so that evolution of simulated time will match actual 
time simulation. 
(c) Adaptive bargaining power 
The proposed EMS is concerned with choosing the bargaining power arbitrarily. In the future 
work, the bargaining powers will be updated adaptively during the EMS coding process. 
(d) Reliability, scalability and data communication privacy 
In this work, the issues of reliability, scalability, and communication data privacy issues have 
not been addressed. In the future work, these issues could be addressed. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A 
Input Parameters used in the simulation 
Table A1: Electricity demand for both winter and summer seasons (Day 1 for winter and Day 
2 for summer) [3].  
Day Time 
(hr) 
School 
(kW) 
Hotel 
(kW) 
Restaurant 
(kW) 
Fire 
Station 
(kW) 
Residential 
Building 
(kW) 
Hospital 
(kW) 
Day 1 𝑇1  2.1 2.3 8.9 2.1 3.7 3.0 
Day 1 𝑇2  2.1 9.3 3.5 3.3 5.6 4.5 
Day 1 𝑇3  10.7 11.6 8.9 6.8 7.5 7.3 
Day 1 𝑇4  10.7 11.6 17.7 6.8 7.5 7.3 
Day 1 𝑇5  10.7 11.6 8.9 6.8 7.5 7.3 
Day 1 𝑇6  4.3 9.3 17.7 4.1 18.6 5.4 
Day 1 𝑇7  2.1 2.3 8.9 2.1 3.7 3.0 
Day 2 𝑇1  2.1 2.3 8.9 2.1 3.7 3.0 
Day 2 𝑇2 2.1 9.3 3.5 3.3 5.6 4.5 
Day 2 𝑇3  10.7 11.6 8.9 6.8 7.5 7.3 
Day 2 𝑇4  10.7 11.6 17.7 6.8 7.5 7.3 
Day 2 𝑇5  10.7 11.6 8.9 6.8 7.5 7.3 
Day 2 𝑇6  4.3 9.3 17.7 4.1 18.6 5.4 
Day 2 𝑇7   2.1 2.3 8.9 2.1 3.7 3.0 
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Table A2: Time duration 𝑇𝑝 in a day [3] 
Period Time Interval (hr) 
𝑇1  6 
𝑇2  2 
𝑇3  3 
𝑇4  1 
𝑇5 5 
𝑇6 4 
𝑇7 3 
 
Table A3: Weighting factor 𝑊𝑝 
Season Weighting Factor 
Winter 197 
Summer 178 
Total 365 
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Table A4: All other Parameter values 
Parameter Description Unit Location/Value Reference 
𝑦 Project Lifetime Year 20 [88] 
𝑦  Lifetime of Solar Panel Year 20 [88] 
𝑦𝑟𝑒𝑝  Lifetime of Battery Year 10 [88] 
𝐶𝑖 Price of electricity 
imported from main grid 
$/kWh 0.17 [3] 
𝐶𝑒 Price of electricity exported 
from main grid 
$/kWh 0.0131   [3] 
𝑃𝐵𝑚𝑎𝑥 Battery upper limit kW 10 Self-defined 
𝑃𝐵𝑚𝑖𝑛  Battery lower limit kW -10 Self-defined 
𝑃𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥 Solar PV  upper limit kW 20 Self-defined 
𝑃𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑛 Battery  lower limit kW 0 Self-defined 
𝑃𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 Diesel gen.  upper 
limit 
kW 10 Self-defined 
𝑃𝐷𝑚𝑖𝑛 Diesel gen. lower limit kW 3 Self-defined 
𝑖 Interest rate % 12 [3] 
𝐸𝐿𝑃𝑠
𝐿  Lower bound Value for site 
𝑠 
$ Table   From Calculation 
𝜆 Reliability of Solar PV 
panel 
% 0.98 [88]  
𝐸𝑠𝑠′ k- electricity transfer price 
level from site 𝑠 to site 𝑠’ 
$/kWh 0.039-0.109 [3]  
𝜆 Reliability of diesel 
generator 
% 0.98 [88]  
𝜆 Reliability of Battery  % 0.98 [88]   
 Cost of diesel generator US/$kW 500 [88]  
 Cost of solar PV panel US $/W 0.92 [88]  
𝐶𝑓 Fuel Cost  US $/l 0.7 [88]  
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Appendix B 
B1   Conference Paper 
1 Ismaheel Oyeyemi Oladejo, Komla Folly “Energy Management of Grid-connected 
Micro grid using Game Theory” Conference Proceedings SAUPEC/ROB MUCH 
PLASA, Central University of Technology Free State, Bloemfontein. South Africa, 
January 28-30, 2019. 
2 Ismaheel Oyeyemi Oladejo, Komla Folly: “A Game Theory Based Energy 
Management System for a Smart Grid: A Review”  IEEE AFRICON 2019 Conference 
(Accepted) 
B2         Journal Paper 
1 Ismaheel Oyeyemi Oladejo, Komla Folly “Energy Management of Micro grid using 
Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution”  (A paper to be submitted for publication) 
2 Ismaheel Oyeyemi Oladejo, Komla Folly “Energy Trading  of Islanded Micro grid 
using Game Theory” (A Paper to be submitted for publication) 
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Appendix C 
Table C1: Breakdown of electricity transferred between sites in grid-connected mode 
Site Amount of 
electricity 
transferred between 
sites (kW) 
Annual amount of 
electricity 
transferred (kW) 
From To   
School Residential Building 0.9 328.5 
Fire Station Residential Building 0.2 73 
Hospital Residential Building 0.1 36.5 
Fire Station Restaurant 2 730 
Hotel Residential Building 0.2 73 
School Hotel 5.5 2007.5 
Restaurant Hotel 2 730 
Fire Station Hotel 0.7 255.5 
Residential Building Restaurant 4.6 1679 
School Restaurant 3.4 1241 
School Hospital 0.7 255.5 
Residential Building Hotel 2.6 949 
Fire Station School 0.5 182.5 
 
Table C2: Breakdown of electricity transferred between sites in islanded mode 
Site Amount of electricity 
transferred in a day 
(kW) 
Annual amount of 
electricity 
transferred (kW) 
From To   
Hospital Restaurant 20.2 7373 
Residential Building Restaurant 16.3 5945 
Residential Building Fire Station 0.7 255.5 
Residential Building Hotel 4.5 1642.5 
School Hotel 2.8 1022 
Restaurant Hotel 1.4 511 
School Residential Building 13.9 5073.5 
Fire Station Restaurant 11 4015 
Hotel Restaurant 1.5 547.5 
Hotel Residential Building 1.2 438 
School Restaurant 12.7 4635.5 
Fire station Residential Building 10.5 3832.5 
Hospital Residential Building 6.2 2263 
Restaurant Hospital 0.1 36.5 
 
